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Industrial Cyber Vulnerabilities: Lessons
from Stuxnet and the Internet of Things
LAWRENCE J. TRAUTMAN* & PETER C. ORMEROD**
Cyber breaches continue at an alarming pace with new
vulnerability warnings an almost daily occurrence. Discovery of the industrial virus Stuxnet during 2010 introduced a
global threat of malware focused toward disruption of industrial control devices. By the year 2020, it is estimated that
over 30 billion Internet of Things (IoT) devices will exist.
The IoT global market spend is estimated to grow from
$591.7 billion in 2014 to $1.3 trillion in 2019 with a compound annual growth rate of 17%. The installed base of IoT
endpoints will grow from 9.7 billion in 2014 to more than
25.6 billion in 2019. With this tremendous growth in both
data and devices, a security nightmare appears more reasonable than not. The proliferation of novel consumer devices and increased Internet-dependent business and government data systems introduces vulnerabilities of unprecedented magnitude. This paper adds to our understanding of
the development of cyber vulnerabilities resulting directly
from: (1) the Stuxnet code and its progeny, and (2) widespread malware exposure associated with the IoT.
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INTRODUCTION

Our adversaries are becoming more adept at using cyberspace to
threaten our interests and advance their own, and despite improving
cyber defenses, nearly all information, communication networks,
and systems will be at risk for years.
Daniel R. Coats
Director of National Intelligence
May 11, 20171
Cyber breaches continue at an alarming pace and new vulnerability warnings are an almost daily occurrence.2 The following categories of U.S. infrastructure have been identified as critical to the
well-being of the nation: information and communications; banking
and finance; water supply; aviation, highways, mass transit, pipelines, rail, and waterborne commerce; emergency and law enforcement services; emergency, fire, and continuity of government services; public health services; electric power, oil, and gas production;
and storage.3 Discovery of the industrial virus Stuxnet during 2010
introduced a global threat of malware that targets and destroys industrial control devices.4

1
Statement for the Record: Hearing on Worldwide Threat Assessment of the
US Intelligence Community Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th
Cong. 1 (2017) (statement of Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence).
2
See Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Cyberattack the Next Pearl Harbor?, 18
N.C. J.L. & TECH. 233, 235 (2016); Lawrence J. Trautman, Congressional Cybersecurity Oversight: Who’s Who and How It Works, 5 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 1,
3–4 (2015); Lawrence J. Trautman, Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy?, U.
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 341, 345–47 (2015); Lawrence J. Trautman, Following
the Money: Lessons from the Panama Papers, Part 1: Tip of the Iceberg, 121
PENN ST. L. REV. 807, 810 (2017).
3
See THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, PRESIDENTIAL
POLICY DIRECTIVE—CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AND RESILIENCE
(2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidentialpolicy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil
[hereinafter
PRESIDENTIAL POLICY ON INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY].
4
See Michael Joseph Gross, A Declaration of Cyber-War, VANITY FAIR
(Mar. 2, 2011, 12:00 AM), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2011/03/stuxnet201104.
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By the year 2020, experts estimate 30 billion Internet of Things
(IoT) devices will exist.5 The IoT global market spend is estimated
to “grow from $591.7 billion in 2014 to $1.3 trillion in 2019 with a
compound annual growth rate of 17%.”6 And “[t]he installed base
of IoT endpoints will grow from 9.7 billion in 2014 to more than
25.6 billion in 2019.”7 With this tremendous growth in both data and
devices, a security nightmare is far more likely than not.
The proliferation of novel consumer devices and increased Internet-dependent business and government data systems introduces
vulnerabilities of unprecedented magnitude.8 Digital vulnerabilities
touch upon a number of different areas of the law: privacy,9 risk
management,10 corporate governance11 (including the duties of

5

See VERIZON, STATE OF THE MARKET: INTERNET OF THINGS 2016 3 (2016),
https://www.verizon.com/about/sites/default/files/state-of-the-internet-of-thingsmarket-report-2016.pdf.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
See Trey Herr & Allan Friedman, Redefining Cybersecurity, 8 AM.
FOREIGN POL’Y COUNCIL – DEF. TECH. PROGRAM BRIEF 1, 1–2 (2015); Daniel J.
Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 23–24 (2003).
9
See Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data and the Future for
Privacy, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON DIGITAL TRANSFORMATIONS 272, 283 (F.
Xavier Olleros & Majlinda Zhegu eds., 2016); Corey Ciocchetti, The Privacy Matrix, 12 U. FLA. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 245, 249 (2007); Sasha Romanosky & Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy Costs and Personal Data Protection: Economic and Legal Perspectives, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1061, 1064–65 (2009); Daniel J.
Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 590 (2014); Robert Kirk Walker, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 257, 269–70 (2012); Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay
Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection (Version 2.0) 3 (George
Washington Law Sch. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 132, 2005).
10
See Liam M. D. Bailey, Mitigating Moral Hazard in Cyber-Risk Insurance,
3 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 1, 8–9 (2014); Shauhin A. Talesh, Data Breach, Privacy, and Cyber Insurance, 6–7 (Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 201723, 2017).
11
See Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22
REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 788 (2009); Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara AltenbaumerPrice, The Board’s Responsibility for Information Technology Governance, 28 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 313, 315–17 (2011); John Armour et al.,
Agency Problems, Legal Strategies, and Enforcement 9, 11–12 (John M. Olin Ctr.
for Law, Econ., & Bus., Working Paper No. 644, 2009).
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care,12 monitor,13 and disclosure14), breach notification,15 information and data security,16 securities regulation,17 law of war,18 constitutional provisions,19 and more.20 This Article adds to our under-

12

See Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and
Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 574–75 (2008); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1780–81 (2001); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of
Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 11 (2006).
13
See Robert T. Miller, The Board’s Duty to Monitor Risk After Citigroup,
12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1153, 1154–55 (2010).
14
See Bernard S. Black, The Core Fiduciary Duties of Outside Directors, 3
ASIA BUS. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2001); Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict?
Innovation, “Pure Information,” and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L.
REV. 1601, 1614–15 (2012); Peter P. Swire, A Theory of Disclosure for Security
and Competitive Reasons: Open Source, Proprietary Software, and Government
Systems, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1333, 1344–45 (2006).
15
See Dana J. Lesemann, Once More unto the Breach: An Analysis of Legal,
Technological, and Policy Issues Involving Data Breach Notification Statutes, 4
AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 203, 206–08 (2010); Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 918, 923–25
(2007); Jane K. Winn, Are “Better” Security Breach Notification Laws Possible?,
24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2009); Fabio Bisogni, Evaluating Data Breach
Notification Laws. What Do the Numbers Tell Us? 2 (Aug. 15, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2236144.
16
See Ian Brown et al., Information Security and Cybercrime, in LAW AND
THE INTERNET 671, 671 (Lilian Edwards & Charlotte Waelde eds., 3d ed. 2009);
Daniel J. Solove, The New Vulnerability: Data Security and Personal Information, in SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 111, 111 (Anupam Chander
et al. eds., 2008); Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1708–11 (2010); Richard Warner & Robert H. Sloan, Defending Our Data: The Need for Information
We Do Not Have 1–2 (Aug. 11, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2816010; Josephine Wolff, Models for Cybersecurity Incident Information Sharing and Reporting Policies 3 (Aug. 13, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2587398.
17
See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 732–37 (2006); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, Corporate Information Security, and Securities Regulation, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 129, 136–37 (2005); Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections
upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 869–70 (2003); Lawrence J. Trautman
& George P. Michaely, Jr., The SEC & the Internet: Regulating the Web of Deceit,
68 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 262, 262–63 (2014).
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standing of the development of cyber vulnerabilities resulting directly from: (1) the Stuxnet code and its progeny, and (2) widespread
malware exposure associated with the IoT.
This Article proceeds in eight parts. First, we provide an overview of the industrial cyber vulnerability problem. Second, we explain a chief problem: digital vulnerabilities in industrial systems.
Third, we relate a diverse variety of sources of cybersecurity-related
legal obligations—including corporate duties, data privacy statutes,
and consumer-protection litigation, among others. Fourth is a discussion of the history of the Stuxnet malware—which targeted a
ubiquitous, industrial-control device called programmable logic
controllers (PLCs)—and implications for the future. Fifth, we examine the recent development of the Internet of things—its current
status, known vulnerabilities, and likely future. Sixth is a discussion
of continued exposure of intelligence agency’s cyber toolsets. Seventh, we suggest topics for future research. We then conclude with
some final thoughts.

18

See DANIEL SUI ET AL., WILSON CTR. SCI. & TECH. INNOVATION
PROGRAM, THE DEEP WEB AND THE DARKNET: A LOOK INSIDE THE INTERNET’S
MASSIVE BLACK BOX 11–12 (2015); Christopher S. Yoo, Cyber Espionage or
Cyberwar?: International Law, Domestic Law, and Self-Protective Measures, in
CYBERWAR: LAW AND ETHICS FOR VIRTUAL CONFLICTS 175, 191–93 (Jens David
Ohlin et al. eds., 2015); Steven M. Bellovin et al., Limiting the Undesired Impact
of Cyber Weapons: Technical Requirements and Policy Implications, 3 J.
CYBERSECURITY 59, 60 (2017); Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical
National Infrastructure: A Use of Force Invoking the Right of Self-Defense, 38
STAN. J. INT’L L. 207, 209–12 (2002); Michael N. Schmitt & Sean Watts, The
Decline of International Humanitarian Law Opinio Juris and the Law of Cyber
Warfare, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 189, 224–25 (2015); Scott J. Shackelford et al., Unpacking the International Law on Cybersecurity Due Diligence: Lessons from the
Public and Private Sectors, 17 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 3, 25–27 (2016); Eric Talbot
Jensen, The Tallinn Manual 2.0: Highlights and Insights, 48 GEO. J. INT’L L.
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 2–3), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2932110.
19
See Peter C. Ormerod & Lawrence J. Trautman, A Descriptive Analysis of
the Fourth Amendment and the Third-Party Doctrine in the Digital Age, 28
ALBANY L.J. SCI. & TECH. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 15).
20
See TREY HERR ET AL., BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. & INT’L AFFAIRS, THE
CYBER SECURITY PROJECT, TAKING STOCK: ESTIMATING VULNERABILITY
REDISCOVERY (2017) (discussing vulnerabilities in software).
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THE INDUSTRIAL CYBER VULNERABILITY PROBLEM

What we’re seeing now is a lot of intrusions. We’re seeing a lot of
infiltrations . . . and then the next step is, again, the disruptive, disabling, destructive types of attacks. And so . . . electric grids, water
treatment facilities . . . mass transportation systems . . . railways and
trains, whatever — if those intruders get into those systems and then
can determine how they can in fact interfere in the command and
control systems of these systems, they . . . could . . . put trains onto
the same tracks. They can . . . bring down electric grids . . . .
John Brennan
Former Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counter-terrorism; Former Director, Central Intelligence
Agency21
Critical infrastructure is defined in the USA PATRIOT Act22 as
“systems and assets, . . . physical or virtual, so vital to the United
States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets
would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those

21

See Lawrence J. Trautman, Managing Cyberthreat, 33 SANTA CLARA
HIGH TECH. L.J. 230, 254–55 (2016) (quoting Ritika Singh, Transcript of John
Brennan’s Speech on Yemen and Drones, LAWFARE (Aug. 9, 2012, 2:38 PM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/08/transcript-of-john-brennans-speech-at-thecouncil-on-foreign-relations).
22
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 2001
U.S.C.C.A.N. (115 Stat.) 272 (2001).
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matters.”23 It was Presidential Decision Directive 63 (or PDD-63)24
that identified the requirement to protect the following critical infrastructures: “information and communications; banking and finance;
water supply; aviation, highways, mass transit, pipelines, rail, and
waterborne commerce; emergency and law enforcement services;
emergency, fire, and continuity of government services; public
health services; electric power, oil and gas production; and storage.”25 The following four activities controlled by the federal government were specifically identified by PDD-63: “(1) internal security and federal law enforcement; (2) foreign intelligence; (3) foreign affairs; and (4) national defense.”26
The Obama Administration issued PPD-21, or Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, in February 2013.27 PPD-21 directed the federal government to “work with critical infrastructure
owners and operators . . . to take proactive steps to manage risk and
strengthen the security and resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure, considering all hazards that could have a debilitating impact on national security, economic stability, [or] public health and
safety.”28

23

Id. § 1016(e); see RITA TEHAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44410,
CYBERSECURITY: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AUTHORITATIVE REPORTS AND
RESOURCES 1 n.1 (2017) (“This included causing catastrophic health effects or
mass casualties comparable to those from the use of weapons of mass destruction;
impairing federal agencies’ abilities to perform essential missions or ensure the
public’s health and safety; undermining state and local government capacities to
maintain order and deliver minimum essential public services; damaging the private sector’s capability to ensure the orderly functioning of the economy; having
a negative effect on the economy through cascading disruption of other infrastructures; or undermining the public’s morale and confidence in our national economic and political institution. HSPD-7 has since been superseded by PDD-21.”);
see also Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7; Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC. (Dec.
17, 2003), https://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-presidential-directive-7 (describing the asset loss impact level necessary to deem the asset as “critical”).
24
Presidential Decision Directive 63 on Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Sector Coordinators, 63 Fed. Reg. 41,804 (Aug. 5, 1998).
25
See TEHAN, supra note 23, at 1.
26
Id.
27
Id. (citing PRESIDENTIAL POLICY ON INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY, supra
note 3).
28
PRESIDENTIAL POLICY ON INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY, supra note 3.
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On May 11, 2017, President Trump signed an executive order
intended to improve the federal government’s cybersecurity and
protect critical infrastructure from digital attacks.29 The most “notable changes” include requiring “heads of federal agencies [to] use a
framework developed by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology to assess and manage cyber risk, and prepare a report
within 90 days documenting how they will implement it.”30
Unlike most other nations, in the United States the private sector
owns and operates an estimated 90% of the nation’s critical infrastructure.31 Other significant elements of U.S. critical national infrastructure include those maintained by federal agencies, such as air
traffic control systems, and materials handling operations, such as
mail sorting by the U.S. Postal Service.32
A.
Industrial Control Systems
Industrial control systems (ICS) are ripe targets for digital attack. ICS include: “supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) systems, distributed control systems (DCS), and other
control system configurations such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC).”33 These control systems are vital to the functionality of
the U.S. critical infrastructures, which “are often highly interconnected and mutually dependent systems.”34
ICS are used in a wide swath of industries, including: “electric,
water and wastewater, oil and natural gas, transportation, chemical,
pharmaceutical, pulp and paper, food and beverage, and discrete
manufacturing (e.g., automotive, aerospace, and durable goods).”35

29

Dustin Volz, Trump Signs Order Aimed at Upgrading Government Cyber
Defenses, REUTERS (May 11, 2017, 1:35 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-trump-cyber-idUSKBN1872L9.
30
Id.
31
See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH.,
SPECIAL PUB. 800-82, GUIDE TO INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS (ICS) SECURITY
1 (2015), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.80082r2.pdf (rev. 2) [hereinafter GUIDE TO ICS SECURITY].
32
See id.; see Critical Infrastructure Sectors, U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC.,
https://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors (last updated July 11, 2017).
33
GUIDE TO ICS SECURITY, supra note 31, at 1.
34
Id.
35
Id.
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Generally, SCADA systems are “used to control dispersed assets using centralized data acquisition and supervisory control.”36 DCS are
“used to control production systems within a local area such as a
factory using supervisory and regulatory control.”37 Finally, PLCs
are “used for discrete control for specific applications and generally
provide regulatory control.”38
Cyber threats initially did not pose a risk to ICS, because “ICS
were [typically] isolated systems running proprietary control protocols using specialized hardware and software” and their “components were in physically secured areas and the components were not
connected to IT networks or systems.”39 But as the Internet Protocol
devices proliferate and decrease in price, they have begun to replace
proprietary ICS components—significantly increasing vulnerabilities to digital attacks.40
B.
Vulnerabilities Escalate
By the first quarter of 2017, an all-time high number of disclosed
vulnerabilities had been reached.41 Risk Based Security observes:
“While no significant increase occurred from 2014 to 2016, the
number of disclosed vulnerabilities jumped (29.2%) in Q1 2017.”42
Risk Based Security also notes that if this trend continues, then 2017
is on “the path to become a record-breaking year in the number of
vulnerabilities disclosed!”43 Exhibit 1 below provides a comparison
of first quarter vulnerabilities over a five-year period.

36

Id.
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
See id.
41
See RISK BASED SEC., VULNERABILITY QUICKVIEW: FIRST QUARTER 2017
VULNERABILITY TRENDS 3 (2017).
42
Id.
43
Id.
37
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Exhibit 1
A Comparison of First Quarter 2017
Vulnerabilities to the Past Four Years44

Source: Risk Based Security, Inc.
Statistics for the first quarter of 2017 reveal that the largest target
of attack traffic is the United States, “with Brazil in second place for
the second quarter in a row,” and the United Kingdom in third.45
Furthermore, “[a]ttacks targeting the U.S. were down 9%, while
Brazil saw a nearly 46% increase in web application attacks . . . and
the U.K. a 30% gain.”46 Exhibit 2 depicts the Top 10 Target Countries for Web Application Attacks, Q1 2017.

44

Id.
AKAMAI TECHS., STATE OF THE INTERNET / SECURITY Q1 2017 REPORT 16
(Martin McKeay & Amanda Fakhreddine eds., 2016), https://www.akamai.com/us/en/multimedia/documents/state-of-the-internet/q1-2017-state-of-theinternet-security-report.pdf.
46
Id.
45

772

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:761

Exhibit 2
Top 10 Target Countries for Web Application Attacks,
Q1 201747

Source: Akamai
III.

THE CYBERSECURITY LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Cybersecurity law and compliance with legal obligations is particularly difficult because there is no single source of authority—
such as a comprehensive federal statute or regulation—that exhaustively lists legal obligations and duties. Instead, cybersecurity legal
obligations are “set forth in an ever-expanding patchwork of state,
federal, and international laws, regulations, and enforcement actions, as well as in common law duties, contractual commitments,
and other expressed and implied obligations to provide ‘reasonable’
or ‘appropriate’ security.”48 In this section, we review a trio of corporate data security legal obligations and then turn to address several
other cybersecurity-related legal subjects.
A.
Corporate Duties of Loyalty and Care
Because so much of U.S. critical infrastructure and cyber risk is
in the hands of private corporations, effective governance of these
entities is imperative. At the foundation of our system of corporate
governance, corporate directors have two primary duties: (1) the

47

Id.
THOMAS J. SMEDINGHOFF, INFORMATION SECURITY LAW: THE EMERGING
STANDARD FOR CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 29 (2008).
48
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duty of loyalty (to place the corporate interest ahead of self-interest);49 and (2) the duty of care.50 Subsets of the duty of care include

49

See Larry Catá Backer, Director Independence and the Duty of Loyalty:
Race, Gender, Class and the Disney-Ovitz Litigation, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1011,
1026–27 (2005); Bainbridge et al., supra note 12, at 564; Blair & Stout, supra
note 12, at 1758–59; J. Robert Brown, Jr., Disloyalty Without Limits: “Independent” Directors and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 95 KY. L.J. 53, 58–60
(2006); Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of Director Liability in Corporate Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131,
1132 (2006); Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 936–40
(2006); Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 4–6; Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note
17, at 717–19; Stephanie Greene & Christine Neylon O’Brien, Exceeding Authorized Access in the Workplace: Prosecuting Disloyal Conduct Under the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 281, 285–87 (2013); Darian M. Ibrahim,
Individual or Collective Liability for Corporate Directors?, 93 IOWA L. REV. 929,
955–57 (2008); Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers,
117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075, 1084–86 (2017); Kenneth M. Rosen, Fiduciaries, 58
ALA. L. REV. 1041, 1046–48 (2007); Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 456, 463 (2004); Leo E. Strine, Jr., et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629,
635–36 (2010); Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties Are There in Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1213, 1239–40 (2010); Armour et al., supra note
11, at 2.
50
See William T. Allen, Modern Corporate Governance and the Erosion of
the Business Judgment Rule in Delaware Corporate Law, 4 COMP. RES. L. & POL.
ECON. 1, 10–11 (2008); Douglas M. Branson, The Rule That Isn’t a Rule - the
Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 634–35 (2002); Gregory Scott
Crespi, Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law: The
Need for Closer Alignment, 82 NEB. L. REV. 671, 671–72 (2004); Lisa M. Fairfax,
Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty
Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 409–11 (2005); Lyman P. Q.
Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1630 (2005); Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Corporate Law’s “Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems”, 31 J. CORP. L. 949, 953 (2006); Stephen J. Lubben & Alana
J. Darnell, Delaware’s Duty of Care, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 589, 594–95
(2006); Holger Spamann, Monetary Liability for Breach of the Duty of Care?, 8
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 337, 337–38 (2016); Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, D&O Insurance: A Primer, 1 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 337, 340 (2012).
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the duties to monitor and to be informed. Recently, we have contributed to the corporate governance literature by expanding on the concept of a corporate cybersecurity standard of care.51
Elsewhere, we observe that “[t]he duty of care is a concept
adapted from tort law, and it requires an actor to behave reasonably.”52 Director liability for a breach of the duty of care may arise in
two distinct contexts.53 First, liability may “follow from a board decision that results in a loss because that decision was ill advised or
‘negligent.’”54 Second, liability may “arise from an unconsidered
failure of the board to act in circumstances in which due attention
would, arguably, have prevented the loss.”55
B.
Corporate Duty to Monitor
At its core, a breach of the duty to monitor arises when “a loss
eventuates not from a decision but, from unconsidered inaction.”56
Observing that “[m]ost of the decisions that a corporation, acting
through its human agents, makes are . . . not the subject of director
attention,” the court in Caremark nonetheless recognized that “ordinary business decisions that are made by officers and employees
deeper in the interior of the organization can . . . vitally affect the
welfare of the corporation and its ability to achieve its various strategic and financial goals.”57
To satisfy their obligation to be reasonably informed, corporate
boards at a minimum must “assur[e] themselves that information
51
See Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Corporate Directors’ and
Officers’ Cybersecurity Standard of Care: The Yahoo Data Breach, 66 AM. U. L.
REV. 1231, 1280 (2017) [hereinafter Trautman & Ormerod, Yahoo Data Breach].
52
Id. at 1245 (citing Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care
and Business Judgment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139, 1159–60 (2013)). See
also Scott J. Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Cybersecurity Standard of
Care?: Exploring the Implications of the 2014 NIST Cybersecurity Framework
on Shaping Reasonable National and International Cybersecurity Practices, 50
TEX. INT’L L.J. 303, 315–16 (2015).
53
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch.
1996).
54
Id.
55
Id. (citing E. Norman Veasey & Julie M.S. Seitz, The Business Judgment
Rule in the Revised Model Act, the Trans Union Case, and the ALI Project—A
Strange Porridge, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1483, 1486 (1985)).
56
Id. at 968.
57
Id.
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and reporting systems exist in the organization that are reasonably
designed to provide . . . timely, accurate information sufficient to
allow management and the board . . . to reach informed judgments
concerning . . . the corporation’s compliance with law.”58 This is not
to say that there is a universal, one-size-fits-all solution to the duty
to monitor—“the level of detail that is appropriate for such an information system is a question of business judgment.”59 Nor does the
mere existence of an adequate monitoring system eliminate the risk
“that the corporation will violate laws or regulations, or that senior
officers or directors may nevertheless sometimes be misled or otherwise fail reasonably to detect acts material to the corporation’s
compliance with the law.”60
Accordingly, the duty to monitor requires “the board [to] exercise a good faith judgment that the corporation’s information and
reporting system is in concept and design adequate to assure the
board that appropriate information will come to its attention in a
timely manner.”61 Therefore, to avoid liability and to conform to
relevant legal norms, directors should make a good faith attempt to
ensure the company has a “corporate information gathering and reporting system” that the board finds satisfactory.62 In summary, the
corporate law duty of care centers on whether corporate directors
and officers employed a “good faith effort” to remain reasonably
informed sufficient to exercise good judgment.63

58

Id. at 970.
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. (emphasis added).
62
Id. at 969.
63
Id. at 970; see also William T. Allen et al., Realigning the Standard of
Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van
Gorkom and Its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV.
449, 457 n.31 (2002) (stating that “directors will not be held liable” for a breach
of the duty to monitor without a finding of bad faith); Christopher M. Bruner, Is
the Corporate Director’s Duty of Care a “Fiduciary” Duty? Does It Matter?, 48
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1027, 1046–47 (2013) (asserting that liability under the
Caremark standard requires bad intentions toward the company, such as a “total
board failure to engage in oversight”); Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An
Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business
Judgment Rule, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 680 (2002) (noting that in some states,
directors are presumed to meet the duty of care if the decision was “informed,”
59
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C.
Corporate Duty to Disclose
At least two distinct authorities require that a publicly traded
corporation has a duty to disclose the existence of a data breach: (1)
Delaware state corporate common law, and (2) the SEC’s 2011 corporate finance disclosure guidance, which identifies material data
security risks that companies must disclose under securities law disclosure requirements and accounting standards.64 Therefore, companies that know about a data breach but fail to disclose it to shareholders, regulators, and consumers, risk liability under potentially
corporate, breach notification, and securities laws.
Well established in Delaware common law is the concept that
directors and officers of a corporation have a fiduciary duty to shareholders and the corporation of disclosure—sometimes referred to as
a duty of complete candor.65 Over two decades ago, Professor Lawrence A. Hamermesh noted that Delaware courts have recognized
“that a fiduciary duty to disclose all material information arises
when directors approve any public statement, such as a press release,
regardless of whether any specific stockholder action is sought.”66
Director negligence is irrelevant in assessing the duty to disclose.67
The duty serves two purposes: (1) “to afford stockholders a remedy,” regardless of whether they relied upon a misstatement or omission, and (2) “to afford a ‘virtual per se rule’ of damages,” awarding
stockholders a monetary award “without having to establish actual
loss.”68 In sum, the duty to disclose in Delaware requires that directors provide shareholders with “all material information” about the

and “unless the directors had been . . . grossly negligent in failing to inform themselves, before acting,” courts deem the decision to be informed).
64
See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF CORP. FIN., CF DISCLOSURE
GUIDANCE: TOPIC NO. 2: CYBERSECURITY (2011), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm [hereinafter SEC CF DISCLOSURE
GUIDANCE]; Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 1089–90
(1996).
65
Hamermesh, supra note 64, at 1097 & nn.34–35.
66
Id. at 1091.
67
See id.
68
Id.
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corporation whenever they communicate with the shareholder or
market, even if the shareholder did not request it.69
Guidance provided during 2011 by the SEC’s division of corporation finance notes that “federal securities laws, in part, are designed to elicit disclosure of timely, comprehensive, and accurate
information about risks and events that a reasonable investor would
consider important to an investment decision.”70 Although the Guidance acknowledges that “no existing disclosure requirement explicitly refers to cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents,” the SEC nonetheless required the disclosure of “material information regarding
cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents” to prevent misleading the
public.71 The Guidance provides several examples of situations in
which corporate disclosure is mandatory. First, the Guidance provides that it “expect[s] registrants to evaluate their cybersecurity
risks and take into account all available relevant information, including prior cyber incidents and the severity and frequency of those
incidents.”72 Second, the Guidance advises that:
[r]egistrants should address cybersecurity risks and
cyber incidents . . . if the costs or other consequences
associated with one or more known incidents or the
risk of potential incidents represent a material event,
trend, or uncertainty that is reasonably likely to have
a material effect on the registrant’s results of operations, liquidity, or financial condition.73
The Industrial Internet provides management with an enhanced
capability to mitigate enterprise risk. As Greengard observes, given
“the right software and dashboard in place, it’s possible to view data
across an entire physical infrastructure. In other words, an agency or
organization could clearly determine—based on structural data
69
Shannon German, What They Don’t Know Can Hurt Them: Corporate Officers’ Duty of Candor to Directors, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 221, 233 (2009); see also
Lawrence J. Trautman, Who Qualifies as an Audit Committee Financial Expert
Under SEC Regulations and NYSE Rules?, 11 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 205,
228 (2013) [hereinafter Trautman, Who Qualifies as an Audit Committee Financial Expert?].
70
SEC CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE, supra note 64.
71
Id.
72
Id. (emphasis added).
73
Id.
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rather than opinions and politics—the real world risks and costs of
fixing or ignoring a problem.”74
D.
Challenge to Corporate Governance
Recent years have shown, as well as in these pages to follow,
that “[f]ew enterprise operational areas present as much inherent
risk or prove as difficult to govern as Information Technology”
(IT).75 Not many corporate directors have an engineering, data, or
information technologies background that prepares the director to
bring an expert viewpoint based upon knowledge and experience
about cybersecurity issues to boardroom risk discussions. In recognition of this critically important board responsibility for risk management, “new SEC rules went into effect on February 28, 2010
amending Item 407 of Regulation S-K to require disclosure about
the board’s role in a company’s risk oversight process and its leadership structure.”76 The SEC states that the new disclosure rules require “companies . . . to describe how the board administers its risk
74

See SAMUEL GREENGARD, THE INTERNET OF THINGS 66 (2015).
See Lawrence J. Trautman, The Matrix: The Board’s Responsibility for Director Selection and Recruitment, 11 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 75, 112 (2012) [hereinafter Trautman, The Matrix]; Lawrence J. Trautman, Who Sits on Texas Corporate Boards? Texas Corporate Directors: Who They Are and What They Do, 16
HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 44, 94–95 (2016); Lawrence J. Trautman, E-Commerce,
Cyber, and Electronic Payment System Risks: Lessons from PayPal, 16 U.C.
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 261, 263–64 (2016) [hereinafter Trautman, Lessons from Paypal]; Lawrence J. Trautman, The Board’s Responsibility for Crisis Governance,
13 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 275, 324 (2017); Lawrence J. Trautman, Anthony (Tony)
J. Luppino & Malika Simmons, Some Key Things U.S. Entrepreneurs Need to
Know About the Law and Lawyers, 46 TEX. J. BUS. L. 155, 172 (2016); Trautman,
Who Qualifies as an Audit Committee Financial Expert?, supra note 69, at 232.
76
See Trautman, The Matrix, supra note 75, at 113 & n.84 (quoting Trautman
& Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 11, at 317 & n.15) (“The text of the new rule
reads: (h) Board leadership structure and role in risk oversight. Briefly describe
the leadership structure of the registrant’s board, such as whether the same person
serves as both principal executive officer and chairman of the board, or whether
two individuals serve in those positions, and, in the case of a registrant that is an
investment company, whether the chairman of the board is an ‘interested person’
of the registrant as defined in section 2(a)(19) of the Investment Company Act
(15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(19)). If one person serves as both principal executive officer
and chairman of the board, or if the chairman of the board of a registrant that is
an investment company is an ‘interested person’ of the registrant, disclose
whether the registrant has a lead independent director and what specific role the
75
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oversight function, such as through the whole board, or through a
separate risk committee or the audit committee, for example.”77 Disclosures should address, for example, “whether the individuals who
supervise the day-to-day risk management responsibilities report directly to the board as a whole or to a board committee or how the
board or committee otherwise receives information from such individuals.”78 Such disclosures should also include an explanation of
the board’s leadership structure and the “reasons why” the company
believes that this board leadership structure is the most “appropriate
structure for the company.”79 In companies in which the CEO and
Chairman are the same individual, rule “amendments will require
disclosure of whether and why the company has a lead independent
director, as well as the specific role the lead independent director
plays in the leadership of the company.”80
E.
Other Relevant Legal Authorities
As discussed briefly above, data privacy legal obligations are the
byproduct of an exceptionally complex web of statutes, rules, and
regulations of a dizzying array of sources. A non-comprehensive list
of these sources follows below.
1.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
These include: “privacy laws, data security laws, electronic
transaction laws, corporate governance laws, unfair and deceptive
business practice and consumer protection laws, and breach notification laws.”81

lead independent director plays in the leadership of the board. This disclosure
should indicate why the registrant has determined that its leadership structure is
appropriate given the specific characteristics or circumstances of the registrant. In
addition, disclose the extent of the board’s role in the risk oversight of the registrant, such as how the board administers its oversight function, and the effect that
this has on the board’s leadership structure.”).
77
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NOS. 33-9089, 34-61175, IC-29092,
PROXY DISCLOSURE ENHANCEMENTS (Feb. 28, 2010), http://sec.gov/rules/final/2009/33-9089.pdf.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.; see also Trautman & Michaely, supra note 17, at 278.
81
Trautman & Ormerod, Yahoo Data Breach, supra note 51, at 1235.
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On the federal level, privacy statutes include: Financial Services
Modernization Act of 1999, which concerns the financial sector;82
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,
which concerns healthcare information;83 the Privacy Act of 1974,
which establishes governmental record-keeping requirements;84 and
the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, which applies to all
businesses that collect personal information on the Internet from
children.85
Some federal regulations also require organizations to protect
specific types of data; these include IRS revenue procedures requiring security measures to protect electronic tax records86 and SEC
regulations requiring the protection of corporate financial data.87
Federal banking regulations also impose an obligation on financial
institutions to disclose security breaches.88
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission has been particularly active
enforcing data security obligations. Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTC Act),89 associated Federal Trade Commission enforcement actions, and equivalent state statutes are the chief

82

See Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106–102, 113 Stat.
1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.); see
generally Timothy J. Yeager et al., The Financial Services Modernization Act:
Evolution or Revolution?, 59 J. ECON. & BUS. 313 (2007).
83
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42
U.S.C.).
84
Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (b) (2012).
85
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–02
(2012).
86
See Rev. Proc. 97-22, 1997-1 C.B. 652; Rev. Proc. 98-25, 1998-1 C.B. 689.
87
See 17 C.F.R. § 248.30 (2004); 17 C.F.R. § 257.1(e)(3) (2011).
88
See Supplement A to Appendix B to Part 30, Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer Information and Customer Notice, 12 C.F.R. pt. 30 (2017); see Supplement A to Appendix D-2 to Part
208-Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to
Consumer Information and Consumer Notice, 12 C.F.R. pt. 208 (2017); see Supplement A to Appendix B to Part 364-Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer Information and Customer Notice,
12 C.F.R. pt. 364 (2017) (reviewing commentator feedback on agency proposed
guidance for how institutions should respond and notify consumers following unauthorized access to consumer information).
89
See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
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sources for the imposition of consumer protection data security obligations. From 2005 through the present, the FTC has aggressively
pursued a broad interpretation of the law in its cybersecurity-related
enforcement actions by contending that a company’s failure to provide appropriate data security for consumers’ personal information
was, alone, an unfair (not deceptive) trade practice.90 That is, a company could be liable without ever having misrepresented the extent
of its data security practices to consumers.91 Subsequently, in August 2015, the Third Circuit ratified the FTC’s broader theory of liability.92
On the state level, several states have enacted data security statutes that impose a general obligation on all companies to ensure the
security of personal information.93 Moreover, forty-seven states, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have
also enacted cybersecurity breach notification laws, which impose
an obligation to disclose security breaches to those affected.94

90

See Discussion Draft of H.R.__, A Bill to Require Greater Protection for
Sensitive Consumer Data and Timely Notification in Case of Breach, 112th Cong.
44 (2011) (statement of Edith Ramirez, Comm’r, FTC) (“[T]he Commission enforces the FTC Act’s proscription against unfair . . . acts . . . in cases where a
business[‘s] . . . failure to employ reasonable security measures causes or is likely
to cause substantial consumer injury.”); see The Threat of Data Theft to American
Consumers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Mfg. & Trade of the H.
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. 15 (2011) (statement of David C.
Vladeck, Dir., Bureau of Consumer Prot., FTC) (same).
91
See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, supra note 85.
92
See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 245–47, 249, 259
(3d Cir. 2015) (holding that Wyndham’s failure to secure consumer information,
which resulted in actual harm to consumers, fell within the plain meaning of “unfair”).
93
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5(b) (West 2016); see also SMEDINGHOFF,
supra note 48, at 5.
94
See Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATORS,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx (last updated Feb. 6, 2018).
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2.
COMMON LAW
While commentators have long contended there is, at the very
least, a “common law duty to provide adequate security for corporate data,”95 courts have only more recently explicitly agreed. In
2005, for instance, a state appellate court in Bell v. Michigan Council 2596 held that the “defendant did owe plaintiffs a duty to protect
them from identity theft by providing some safeguards to ensure the
security of their most essential confidential identifying information.”97
And, more recently, a federal district court held:
Although neither party provided the Court with case
law to support or reject the existence of a legal duty
to safeguard a consumer’s confidential information
entrusted to a commercial entity, the Court finds the
legal duty well supported by both common sense and
California and Massachusetts law. As a result, because Plaintiffs allege that they provided their Personal Information to Sony as part of a commercial
transaction, and that Sony failed to employ reasonable security measures to protect their Personal Information, including the utilization of industry-standard
encryption, the Court finds Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a legal duty and a corresponding
breach.98

95

SMEDINGHOFF, supra note 48, at 31 (citing Kimberly Kiefer & Randy V.
Sabett, Openness of Internet Creates Potential for Corporate Information Security Liability, 1 BNA PRIVACY & SECURITY L. REP. 788 (2002); Alan Charles Raul
et al., Liability for Computer Glitches and Online Security Lapses, 6 BNA ELEC.
COMMERCE L. REP. 849 (2001); Erin Kenneally, The Byte Stops Here: Duty and
Liability for Negligent Internet Security, 16 COMPUTER SECURITY J. 1 (2000)).
96
No. 246684, 2005 WL 356306 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2005) (per curiam).
97
Id. at *5.
98
In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F.
Supp. 2d 942, 966 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (citations omitted); see generally Lawrence J.
Trautman, The SONY Data Hack: Implications for World Order (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
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3.
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
When third parties have possession of, control over, or access to
corporate data, companies that entrust third parties to manage their
data are increasingly trying to satisfy their duty to protect the security of their data by contract.99
4.
SELF-IMPOSED OBLIGATIONS
Finally, companies have also imposed requirements on themselves. In addition to the FTC’s unfair theory of cybersecurity liability, the agency also aggressively enforces representations that organizations make about their own security practices under a deceptive trade practice theory.100
5.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
A comprehensive review of the multitude of U.S. Constitutional
issues implicated by the fast-developing digital threats reviewed below is beyond the scope of this paper and will likely be the topic of
a future body of scholarly work from us. Given the space limitations
provided to a single law journal article, we can do little more here
than provide a modest list of a few of the major issues implicated.
These topics include: First Amendment;101 Third Amendment;102

99

SMEDINGHOFF, supra note 48, at 33.
See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 626 (D.N.J.
2014), aff’d, 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that in light of Wyndham’s
publication of a privacy policy, in which it promised to protect consumers’ personal information, the failure to implement corresponding security measures
amounted to an unfair practice under the FTC Act).
101
See Timothy Zick, Clouds, Cameras, and Computers: The First Amendment and Networked Public Places, 59 FLA. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2007).
102
See Alan Butler, When Cyberweapons End Up on Private Networks: Third
Amendment Implications for Cybersecurity Policy, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1203,
1206–07, 1227 (2013).
100
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Fourth Amendment;103 Broadcast regulation;104 copyright law issues;105 legality of war;106 and privacy.107
F.
The Cybersecurity Standard of Care
Evolving concepts of cyber specific law remain challenged by
the rapid pace of developing technologies.108 Elsewhere, we have
presented a detailed discussion outlining the concept of Corporate
Directors’ and Officers’ Cybersecurity Standard of Care, in part as
a response to the recent Yahoo Data Breaches.109
As noted above and throughout this section, there is no one, single, comprehensive cybersecurity statute or regulation. This patchwork of authorities has given rise to a one-size-fits-all process-ori-

103

See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth
Amendment of Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 825–26 (2016); Katherine J.
Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amendment Implications
of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614, 626–27 (2011); see also Ormerod
& Trautman, supra note 19 (manuscript at 15).
104
See Thomas Fetzer & Christopher S. Yoo, New Technologies and Constitutional Law, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 485, 486
(Mark Tushnet et al. eds., 2013).
105
See Lidiya Mishchenko, The Internet of Things: Where Privacy and Copyright Collide, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 90, 100 (2016).
106
See Gary D. Brown & Andrew O. Metcalf, Easier Said than Done: Legal
Reviews of Cyber Weapons, 7 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 115, 118–20 (2014);
Christopher S. Yoo, Cyber Espionage or Cyberwar? International Law, Domestic
Law, and Self-Protective Measures, in CYBERWAR: LAW AND ETHICS FOR
VIRTUAL CONFLICTS 175, 191–93 (Jens David Ohlin et al. eds., 2015); Carol M.
Hayes & Jay P. Kesan, Law of Cyber Warfare 2 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory,
Research Paper Series No. 14-26, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2396078.
107
See Adam D. Thierer, The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology:
Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns Without Derailing Innovation, 21
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2015).
108
See Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Disruptive Blockchain Technology the Future of Financial Services?, 69 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 232, 232–33 (2016);
Lawrence J. Trautman & Alvin C. Harrell, Bitcoin Versus Regulated Payment
Systems: What Gives?, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1041, 1050 (2017); Trautman, Lessons from Paypal, supra note 75, 282–83; Lawrence J. Trautman, Virtual Currencies: Bitcoin & What Now After Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, and Mt. Gox?, 20
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2014); Lawrence J. Trautman, How Google Perceives
Customer Privacy, Cyber, E-commerce, Political and Regulatory Compliance
Risks 5–6 (2018) (unpublished manuscript).
109
See Trautman & Ormerod, Yahoo Data Breach, supra note 51, at 1234–35.
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ented approach to organizational data security: the Written Information Security Program (WISP).110 This “emerging digital security
standard is particularized and case specific,” and that, “[u]nlike
prior specific requirements, such as passwords or firewalls, the new
corporate security obligation is fact-specific, requiring companies to
go through a ‘process’ and determine what security measures are
most appropriate for the company’s security needs.”111 Under the
WISP protocol, organizations create their own specific security
measures and are required to “conduct ongoing reviews of their security mechanisms.”112 “This repetitive review process includes detecting and evaluating risks, implementing specific security responses to those risks, verifying the effective implementation of
those security responses, and updating the measures as needed in
reaction to developing security concerns.”113
The seven steps of a comprehensive WISP protocol are:
Assign Responsibility: A corporation should expressly designate one or more employees to be responsible for maintaining the data security program.
Identify Information Assets: A corporation should
identify its information assets that require protection,
which include both the data itself (i.e., records containing personal information) and the computing systems that store the personal information (e.g., servers, laptops, and portable devices).
Conduct Risk Assessment: A corporation should perform a risk assessment to identify both internal and
external risks to its data security, and it should evaluate the effectiveness of the company’s current practices for safeguarding and minimizing the risks identified.
110

Thomas J. Smedinghoff, An Overview of Data Security Legal Requirements for All Business Sectors 11 (Oct. 8, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2671323.
111
Trautman & Ormerod, Yahoo Data Breach, supra note 51, at 1241 (citing
Smedinghoff, supra note 110, at 9–10).
112
Id.
113
Id. at 1241–42.

786

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:761

Select and Implement Responsive Security Controls:
A corporation should implement physical, administrative, and technical security controls it considers
appropriate to minimize the risks it identified in its
risk assessment.
Monitor Effectiveness: A corporation should regularly monitor, test, and reassess the security controls
it has chosen to implement in order to ensure its security program is operating in a manner reasonably
calculated to protect personal information. Relatedly,
a corporation should regularly upgrade its security
controls as necessary to limit emerging risks.
Regularly Review the Security Program: A corporation should review and adjust its data security program no less than once per year. A corporation
should also perform security program reviews whenever there is a material change in business practices
that could affect personal information or after any incident involving a breach of its data security.
Address Third Party Issues: A corporation should
take all reasonable steps to verify that every thirdparty service provider that has access to the company’s data assets and personal information has the
capacity to protect that information.114
More and more authorities are endorsing the process-oriented
approach of WISP for complex organizations facing myriad and diverse digital security difficulties. Of particular note is the recent
adoption of the WISP protocol by a Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, an approached favored by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission.115

114
115

Id. at 1242.
See id. at 1243–45.

2018]

INDUSTRIAL CYBER VULNERABILITIES

IV.

787

STUXNET

Cyber threats are already challenging public trust and confidence
in global institutions, governance, and norms, while imposing costs
on the US and global economies. Cyber threats also pose an increasing risk to public health, safety, and prosperity as cyber technologies are integrated with critical infrastructure in key sectors.
These threats are amplified by our ongoing delegation of decisionmaking, sensing, and authentication roles to potentially vulnerable automated systems. This delegation increases the likely physical, economic, and psychological consequences of cyber attack and
exploitation events when they do occur.
Daniel R. Coats
Director of National Intelligence
May 11, 2017116
Digital threats to objects—and people—in the physical world
increased by leaps and bounds in July 2010, when the world’s foremost digital security experts discovered a computer virus radically
different and far more sophisticated than any seen previously.117 The
mysteries of the virus’s author and purpose unraveled throughout
the end of 2010, and by early 2011 a single hypothesis had garnered
widespread acceptance, which was confirmed in June 2012:118 this
piece of malware, dubbed “Stuxnet” (or code name Olympic
Games)119 was a covert joint operation between the United States
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and Israel to sabotage Iranian centrifuges—industrial machines integral to the purification of radioactive uranium.120 By modulating
the speed that Iranian centrifuges spun, Stuxnet covertly devastated
the machines from within—representing the first time the world
“had seen digital code in the wild being used to physically destroy
something in the real world.”121
The ramifications of the Stuxnet virus are profound. Some have
called Stuxnet “the first unattributable act of war.”122 Stuxnet represents a paradigm shift in how warfare could increasingly be waged
in the 21st century.123 Unlike traditional military clashes, these conflicts will take place in secret, over the Internet.124 For the people
whose lives depend on the targets of the cyber weapons, “the results
could be as catastrophic as a bombing raid, but would be even more
disorienting.”125
Yet aside from these military implications, Stuxnet represents an
entirely new type of weapon—a digital warhead capable of devastating tangible structures, systems, and the people that depend on
them, far from a theater of battle.126 Because Stuxnet exploited a tiny
computer that is ubiquitous in modern industrial machinery, a virus
similar to Stuxnet could have immensely harmful effects on industrialized nations’ critical infrastructure.127 The tiny computers Stuxnet commandeered were PLCs.128 PLCs perform tasks as varied as
opening and shutting valves in water pipes, timing the change of
traffic lights, and dolloping out the appropriate amount of cream into
120
DAVID E. SANGER, CONFRONT AND CONCEAL: OBAMA’S SECRET WARS
AND SURPRISING USE OF AMERICAN POWER x (2012); Derek E. Bambauer, Schrödinger’s Cybersecurity, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 791, 794 (2015); William J. Broad
et al., Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay, N.Y. TIMES
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individual Oreo cookies.129 Stuxnet’s hijacking of the PLCs in Iranian centrifuges is a dire warning: the very basis of modern industrial life is an exploitable target for a cyber attack.
Stuxnet and its progeny have revealed the susceptibility of critical civilian infrastructure to digital attack. Details of the Stuxnet virus illuminate why the virus represents a dramatic shift in cyberwarfare. Understanding the novel threat that Stuxnet presents, critical infrastructure has nonetheless failed to address and fix the vulnerabilities that Stuxnet exploited. Further, the existing cyber-security legal framework in the United States may prove inadequate to
address the challenges that Stuxnet presents.
A.
The Stuxnet Virus
On June 17, 2010, Sergey Ulasen, the head of an anti-virus division of a small information technology security company based in
Belarus, read an e-mail report explaining that a virus had infected a
client’s computer in Iran, and the virus caused the client’s computer
to continually reboot.130 After obtaining a copy of the virus and sharing it among some colleagues, the men discovered that the virus was
infecting Microsoft’s Windows operating system, “using a vulnerability that had never been detected before.”131 Such a discovery is a
substantial event; a vulnerability that the program’s creator is unaware of and that has never before been detected is referred to as a
“zero day.”132 Of the more than twelve million pieces of malware
that antivirus researchers discover annually, fewer than a dozen utilize a zero-day vulnerability.133 Windows’ zero days can fetch as
much as $100,000 on the black market likely because of their ability
to be employed for a number of nefarious purposes.134
But the virus Ulasen and his colleagues was studying was remarkable in a number of other respects as well. For one, the virus
spread in a way that had previously never been seen. By inserting a
flash drive into a computer, the virus covertly uploaded two files—
one, a piece of code that granted the virus complete control over the
129
130
131
132
133
134
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computer, and second, a payload of heavily encrypted malicious
code.135
Alarmingly, once the two components uploaded themselves
from the flash drive, they hid themselves within the host computer.136 Doing so is no simple task—the virus employed “a digital
signature” to fool the host computer into believing the virus was a
legitimate piece of software.137 Digital signatures are analogous to
passports; they serve as a proof of identity and legitimacy for software crossing from one computer to another.138 In the past, malware
writers have used fake, forged digital signatures to trick the target
computer, but software security consultants have long suspected that
sooner or later malware writers would jump to using genuine, stolen
digital signatures instead.139 The virus Ulasen and his colleagues had
discovered was the first documented instance of a genuine, stolen
digital signature.140 Moreover, the digital signature had been stolen
from one of the most trusted names in cyber-security—Realtek.141
Thus, “the new virus Ulasen was looking at might as well have been
carrying a cop’s badge.”142
Given the alarming sophistication of this virus, on July 5 Ulasen
began alerting a number of authorities: first was Microsoft, to notify
the company of the zero day vulnerability that the virus exploited;
second was Realtek, to make the company aware of the stolen digital
signature; finally, on July 12 Ulasen posted a report about the virus
on a cyber-security message board.143 Once alerted, internet authorities revoked the digital signature the virus was using.144 But shockingly, on July 14 a new version of the virus appeared that used another genuine, stolen digital signature—this one from a different
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company.145 This evidence strongly suggested that someone was actively helping the virus continue to avoid detection.146
Three days after Ulasen posted about the virus, a cyber-security
blogger published a story about the virus—at this point dubbed
“Stuxnet” by Microsoft using a combination of file names found in
the malicious code.147 As the news of Stuxnet spread, “antivirus
companies around the world scrambled” to obtain copies of the malware for their own research purposes.148 As the computer security
industry worked to decrypt and deconstruct Stuxnet, more troubling
information came to light. For one, it appeared that the virus first
appeared around a year earlier—in June 2009—and its creator had
updated and refined the virus numerous times, releasing at least
three different versions before Ulasen’s discovery in June 2010.149
Second, the geographical location of infected computers was
anomalous. In the past, South Korea and the United States were
overwhelmingly the epicenters of malware infections, given those
countries’ outsized number of Internet connections.150 Of the 38,000
initial Stuxnet infections, approximately 22,000 were in Iran. 151 Indonesia placed a distant second with approximately 6,700 infections, and India with 3,700; the United States had fewer than 400
infections.152 Third, researchers discovered that Stuxnet did not exploit a single zero day vulnerability in Windows, but instead four
zero day vulnerabilities.153 This “was unprecedented—one of the
great technical blockbusters in malware history.”154
The fourth anomaly was the virus’s apparent target. Cyber-security experts deduced that “the virus was designed to target . . . an
industrial control system made by the German conglomerate Siemens that was used to program controllers that drive motors, valves
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and switches in everything from food factories and automobile assembly lines to gas pipelines and water treatment plants.”155 Traditionally, computer viruses have been employed for financial gain,
such as stealing credit card data, online banking information, and
trade secrets.156 Stuxnet’s targeting of these industrial control systems—known as “programmable logic controllers,” or PLCs—was
odd because there was no obvious information to exploit for financial gain.157 Stuxnet appeared to simply be stealing data from Siemens PLCs, and most experts were prepared to write Stuxnet off as
an unusually sophisticated case of corporate espionage.158
Researchers from Symantec, one the world’s largest engineers
of computer security software, were dissatisfied with attributing
such an advanced piece of malware to mere espionage and undertook a massive effort to discover Stuxnet’s true purpose.159
Throughout July 2010, a team of analysts and experts positioned
across the globe160 made the aforementioned discovery that Stuxnet’s malicious payload would only spring into action once it detected that a host computer was running a piece of software that controls a Siemens PLC.161
Further, the Symantec engineers discovered that when Stuxnet
found a host computer attached to a Siemens PLC, it would intercept
the information exchanged between the host computer and the
PLC.162 Stuxnet would commandeer the PLC by injecting its own
malicious code into the PLC, while simultaneously disabling any
automated alarms the PLC would report back to the host computer;
in effect, Stuxnet hid the rouge commands the virus was sending to
the PLC from the host computer.163 Thus, someone monitoring the
PLC from the host computer would operate under the assumption
that the PLC was functioning normally while in reality Stuxnet was
serendipitously controlling the PLC.164 In sum, Stuxnet worked
155
156
157
158
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160
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“like a Hollywood heist film where jewelry thieves insert a looped
video clip into a surveillance camera feed so that guards watching
monitors see only a benign image instead of a live feed of the thieves
in action.”165
On August 6, 2010, Symantec published a blog post that laid out
the company’s findings regarding Stuxnet’s true purpose.166 But little immediate reaction followed because of a simple problem—most
cyber-security experts knew very little about PLCs and what effect
Stuxnet could have on them.167
Meanwhile in Germany, a man named Ralph Langner, who
knew very little about cyber-security but quite a bit about PLCs,
took up the case after reading Symantec’s post.168 “Langner knew
that thousands of Siemens customers had a potentially silent killer
on their system, and they were waiting for Symantec or Siemens to
tell them what Stuxnet was doing to their industrial controllers.”169
Yet no word from Siemens or Symantec came, and thus Langner—
with his primitive and self-taught knowledge of computers—delved
into the virus’s code himself.170
After three weeks of work, Langner and his small team came to
a startling conclusion—Stuxnet was not aimed at all Siemens PLCs,
as the corporate espionage theory would suggest; instead, the virus
searched for a specific technical configuration—a single facility—
and sought to infiltrate only it.171 To Langner, the various clues
pointed to a single conclusion: a well-funded organization, most
likely a government with precise knowledge of its target, had written
Stuxnet.172 Langner explained his deduction as follows: “[t]o see
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that somebody built such [sic] sophisticated piece of malware—using four zero-day vulnerabilities, using two stolen certificates—to
attack one single installation? That’s unbelievable.”173
While Stuxnet’s exact target had not been identified, Langner
had a hunch as to where the virus was aimed.174 At one point,
Langner announced to two colleagues, “[t]his is about taking out
Bushehr,” referring to an Iranian nuclear power plant that had been
scheduled to go operational in August 2010 but had been delayed
with little explanation.175 Langner’s colleagues were leery of his theory of state-sponsored cyber-terrorism that likely implicated the
United States and Israel, but Langner remained undeterred.176
Eventually, Langner simply put his theory into the public; he
posted on his blog his belief “that Stuxnet was the first literal cyberweapon,” and it was aimed at the Iranian nuclear program at Bushehr.177 On September 21, 2010, The Christian Science Monitor
reported a story on Langner’s theory;178 the next day, another German computer expert went on the record to assert that Stuxnet’s target was not Bushehr, but was instead Iran’s Natanz uranium-enrichment facility.179 On January 15, 2011, The New York Times accelerated the story, suggesting that Stuxnet was a covert United States
intelligence project that began under President George W. Bush and
hastened under President Barack Obama.180
As the rumors swirled online in response to Langner’s theory,
the engineers at Symantec continued to dismantle the virus’s code,
struggling to provide concrete evidence to corroborate one of the
various theories.181 The break came in November—Symantec had
posted a request on its blog for anyone with expertise in critical infrastructure to contact Symantec, and a Dutch programmer wrote
173
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back.182 The Dutch programmer provided a critical piece of information that led Symantec to the ultimate resolution of Stuxnet’s purpose.183
Using the Dutch programmer’s tip, the Symantec engineers discovered that Stuxnet’s target was not all PLCs but only a specific
type of PLCs, called frequency converters.184 “Frequency converters
modulate the speed of motors and rotors in things like high-speed
drills,” so if you increase the frequency of the drive, then the rotor
increases its spin.185 Additional research into what type of machinery spun at the frequencies that Stuxnet modulated revealed a startling answer—the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulates
for export from the United States machines that spun at the frequencies Stuxnet targeted.186 One Symantec engineer recalled the moment of enlightenment: “We realized, wait a second, these things, at
this frequency, could be used for uranium enrichment.”187
Thus, the engineers were able to corroborate Langner’s theory
and reveal what Stuxnet was doing when it injected its own malicious code into the PLCs: increasing the frequency that centrifuges
spin.188 In short, Stuxnet “was designed to send Iran’s nuclear centrifuges spinning wildly out of control.”189 Symantec’s discovery cemented the conclusion that Stuxnet was not intended for espionage
but for causing physical damage.190 Stuxnet “was the first time anyone had seen digital code in the wild being used to physically destroy something in the real world.”191 As Langner puts it, “Code
analysis makes it clear that Stuxnet is not about sending a message
or proving a concept . . . . It is about destroying its targets with utmost determination in military style.”192
Once the purpose of Stuxnet was discovered, the obvious next
question was of attribution. In January 2011, The New York Times
182
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published a lengthy story that alleged Israel’s Dimona complex in
the Negev desert—the heavily fortified center of Israel’s neveracknowledged nuclear weapon program—doubled as a critical testing ground for Stuxnet.193 The article further alleged that Stuxnet
represented a “joint American and Israeli effort to undermine Iran’s
efforts to make a [nuclear] bomb of its own.”194 Within the
Dimona’s complex, the quoted experts asserted, Israel had spun the
exact same type of nuclear centrifuges found at Natanz in an effort
to test and refine the Stuxnet virus.195 One American nuclear intelligence expert asserted, “To check out the worm, you have to know
the machines . . . . The reason the worm has been effective is that
the Israelis tried it out.”196
One of the most difficult remaining questions surrounding Stuxnet was its degree of success. Given the opaqueness of the Iranian
government, experts have differed on whether or not Stuxnet accomplished its ends.197 A preliminary assessment paper for the Institute
for Science and International Security asserted that Stuxnet’s effectiveness is difficult to ascertain, given the uncertainty regarding both
the virus’s exact purpose and overall effect.198 Given these limitations, the authors still asserted that if Stuxnet’s aim was to destroy
all of the centrifuges at Natanz, then Stuxnet failed; but if Stuxnet’s
goal was to destroy a limited number of centrifuges, thereby setting
back the Iranian nuclear program while making detection of the virus difficult, then Stuxnet “may have succeeded, at least for a little
while.”199 In sum, the data suggest that between late 2009 and early
2010, Iran faced significant difficulties with centrifuges at Natanz,
decommissioning and replacing approximately 1,000 machines.200
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The authors were careful to note that this level of replacement “exceeded expectations and occurred during an extended period of relatively poor centrifuge performance.”201
B.
Implications for Critical Infrastructure
While Stuxnet is fascinating in a myriad of respects—geopolitical and technological, to name a few—the virus also serves as a stark
warning. Even in the wake of the Stuxnet virus, the critical infrastructure industry has shown little appetite for implementing
measures that would remedy glaring vulnerabilities in its defenses.
Organizations that own and operate critical infrastructure should
adopt a WISP protocol in order to identify and mitigate the threats
confronting them.
The problem that Stuxnet poses is that its target—PLCs—is
ubiquitous in modern life.202 The PLC is one of the most important
modern manufacturing innovations.203 By permitting manufacturers
to automate industrial processes in real time, coupled with the ability
to withstand extreme temperatures, electrical noise, and vibration,
the PLC “changed the way we automate our factories and is still
widely in use today.”204
But before Stuxnet, few had reason to believe that PLCs were
exploitable. Stuxnet represented “the first time anyone had seen digital code . . . being used to physically destroy something in the real
world.”205 In testimony before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce in July 2011, officials from the United States Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) attested to Stuxnet representing a game changer:206 “DHS
analysis concluded that this highly complex computer worm was the
first of its kind, written to specifically target mission-critical control
201
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systems running a specific combination of software and hardware.”207 In the next breath, DHS officials warned that clones of
Stuxnet could attack the country’s power generation plants, water
treatment facilities, and other critical infrastructure.208 The officials
asserted that the purpose of such an attack on critical infrastructure
“would be to shut down or impair the infrastructure on which normal
civilian life depends, diverting scarce resources, hurting civilian
support for the war effort, and complicating military mobilization
that depends on the civilian infrastructure.”209
Yet the threat that Stuxnet clones pose for industrialized nations’
critical infrastructure cuts two ways. On one hand, Stuxnet represents an opportunity for terrorists, hackers, criminals, or nationstates to infiltrate and damage another country’s electrical, financial,
gas, oil, water, and sewage systems. But on the other hand, Stuxnet’s
level of sophistication has left many industry leaders shrugging their
shoulders, doubting that their systems are likely targets.
McAfee, another computer security giant, recently conducted a
global survey of critical infrastructure companies to ascertain their
level of cybersecurity and preparation against cyberattacks.210
“Two-fifths of all respondents, and nearly half of those in the electric industry, said that they had found Stuxnet on their systems.”211
McAfee acknowledged that while Stuxnet was likely aimed at a single facility and was harmless to other sites, the widespread infection
207
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represents an utter failure of industry’s cybersecurity measures.212
Yet, “the discovery of Stuxnet on their systems did not seem to galvanize companies to action.”213 At least one expert attributes industry’s inaction to governmental apathy, stating that “without clear
government policy on the issue, individual ministries and companies
are left to implement their own measures.”214
Even more troubling, industry continues to willfully ignore the
threat that a Stuxnet-like attack poses. Industry executives told
McAfee with near unanimity that they remained more concerned
about denial-of–service (DoS) attacks than about malware like Stuxnet.215 A third of respondents to McAfee’s global survey “declared
that they were not at all confident or not very confident” in their
ability to combat a DoS attack, but when prompted regarding malware designed for sabotage, “respondents expressed a similar lack
of confidence only about 20 percent of the time.”216 A United Statesbased cybersecurity expert confirmed, “After Stuxnet, many people
said, ‘I don’t have Siemens, I’m not nuclear—I could [sic] care
less.’”217 As McAfee noted in its published report, getting the critical infrastructure industry to perceive Stuxnet as a potential problem
is a massive impediment to progress.218
Indeed, we have previously seen a very similar example of industry’s inaction to the threat of a malware infiltration: the original
wave of attacks on Microsoft’s Windows in the 1990s. Microsoft
was initially caught flat-footed when researchers and hackers first
began exploiting vulnerabilities in Windows.219 “It was only after
several years of antagonism between [Microsoft headquarters] and
the hackers ripping apart its software that Microsoft figured out how
to work with hackers.”220 In the 1990s, researchers became so weary
with Microsoft’s inaction whenever the researchers would find a
212
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vulnerability, they simply began publishing technical details, thus
forcing Microsoft to release a fix before the vulnerability could be
exploited for nefarious ends.221
But continued antagonism between hackers and critical infrastructure is not tenable. Having this pattern repeat in the context of
critical infrastructure is far more troublesome because “a security
flaw could lead to a chemical spill or a widespread power blackout,
and . . . it can take months to schedule and install [software
fixes].”222 One information-security expert with Boeing asserted
that the infrastructure industry is “basically just 10 years behind the
curve on security. It’s like we’re going back to the ‘90s.”223
Finally, variations of the Stuxnet worm have been appearing
nearly since it was first discovered. In October 2011, a new virus,
dubbed “Duqu,” which utilized large portions of Stuxnet’s original
source code, surfaced online.224 According to Symantec, who initially posted a bulletin warning of the virus, Duqu’s purpose is entirely different than Stuxnet.225 Duqu’s purpose is to gather intelligence data and assets from entities such as industrial control system
manufacturers in order to more easily conduct a future attack against
another third party.226 The attackers are looking for information such
as design documents that could help them mount a future attack on
an industrial control facility.227
Similarly, in May 2012, a consortium of researchers unveiled
their findings about a piece of malware related to Stuxnet, which
they dubbed Flame.228 Much like Stuxnet and Duqu, Flame is a com-
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plex virus with a number of modular components that strongly suggest its use in a sophisticated, targeted attack.229 Media reports later
confirmed the United States’ National Security Agency (NSA) developed all three strains of malware as part of the same Olympics
Game operation.230
With Stuxnet’s source code still widely available on the Internet,
there is no telling who or what may utilize the original coding for
new and more devastating attacks upon an industry that is moving
too slowly in response to these warning signs.
Risk Based Security states that for 2017, SCADA products only
accounted for 2% of all reported vulnerabilities.231 In addition, “this
decline in the number of vulnerabilities found in SCADA products
seems to reflect the fact that researchers are no longer focusing on
SCADA products rather than a significant improvement in SCADA
product security.”232
Exhibit 3
SCADA Vulnerabilities233

Source: Risk Based Security
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INTERNET OF THINGS

Continued rapid technological progress remains central to economic prosperity and social well-being, but it is also introducing
potential new threats. The Internet of Things (IoT) is connecting billions of new devices to the Internet, but it also broadens the attack
potential of cyber actors against networks and information.
Daniel R. Coats
Director of National Intelligence
May 11, 2017234
The term “Internet of Things” (IoT) describes “objects embedded with technologies such as microchips, sensors, and actuators
that often use Internet Protocol and share data with other machines
or software over communications networks.”235 Recall that the IoT
234

Statement for the Record: Hearing on Worldwide Threat Assessment of the
US Intelligence Community Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th
Cong. 3 (2017) (statement of Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence).
235
Katherine Britton, Handling Privacy and Security in the Internet of Things,
19 J. INTERNET L. 1, 3 (2016). See also The Connected World: Examining the
Internet of Things: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp.
114th Cong. 89–93 (2015) (statement of Adam D. Thierer, Senior Research Fellow, Mercatus Center, George Mason University); URS GASSER & JOHN PALFREY,
BREAKING DOWN DIGITAL BARRIERS: WHEN AND HOW ICT INTEROPERABILITY
DRIVES INNOVATION 4 (2007), https://cyber.harvard.edu/interop/pdfs/interopbreaking-barriers.pdf; ELLEN P. GOODMAN, THE ASPEN INST., THE ATOMIC AGE
OF DATA: POLICIES FOR THE INTERNET OF THINGS 2–4 (2015), http://csreports.aspeninstitute.org/documents/Atomic_Age_of_Data.pdf; Eric Barbry, The Internet
of Things, Legal Aspects: What Will Change (Everything) . . . , 87 DIGIWORLD
ECON. J. 83, 86–87 (2012); Meg Leta Jones, Privacy Without Screens & the Internet of Other People’s Things, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 639, 641–42 (2015); Scott R.
Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, & Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 88–89 (2014); Gilles
Privat, Extending the Internet of Things, 87 DIGIWORLD ECON. J. 101, 106 (2012);
Jaclyn Selby, Anyone’s Game: Economic and Policy Implications of the Internet
of Things as a Market for Services, 87 DIGIWORLD ECON. J. 21, 22 (2012); Scott
J. Shackelford et al., When Toasters Attack: A Polycentric Approach to Enhancing
the “Security of Things”, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 415, 421 (2017); T.H.A. Wisman,
Purpose and Function Creep by Design: Transforming the Face of Surveillance
Through the Internet of Things, 4 EUR. J.L. & TECH. 1, 1 (2013); Daniela Rus, The
Robots Are Coming: How Technological Breakthroughs Will Transform Everyday Life, 94 FOREIGN AFF. 1, 2 (2015); Paul Kominers, Interoperability Case
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global market spend is estimated to “grow from $591.7 billion in
2014 to $1.3 trillion in 2019 with a compound annual growth rate of
17%. The installed base of IoT endpoints will grow from 9.7 billion
in 2014 to more than 25.6 billion in 2019.”236
A.
The Promise of the Internet of Things
The IoT makes possible a wide assortment of truly wonderful
benefits for daily life. The IoT is “in your home, in your car and
phone, and, increasingly, on your body. It’s connecting citizens to
their cities, linking patients to health services, bringing companies
in closer touch with their customers and capturing our imaginations.”237 Although most Internet data “currently takes the form of
text files, messages, audio, photographs, and video files, the IoT
grabs new and different data, it combines data in different ways and
it allows humans and machines to gain broader and deeper insights.”238
The IoT “quite literally means ‘things’ or ‘objects’ that connect
to the Internet—and each other.”239 Examples are everywhere and
include airplane engines, e-books, computers, Fitbit devices, home
heating and air conditioning systems, home security cameras, and
smartphones.

Study: Internet of Things (IoT) 3 (The Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y, Harvard
Univ., Research Publication No. 2012-10, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2046984; Paul Kominers, Interoperability Case Study: The Smart Grid 2
(The Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y, Harvard Univ., Research Publication No.
2012-6, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2031113; William H. Dutton, The Internet of Things 4 (June 20, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2324902; William Dutton, et al., A Roadmap for Interdisciplinary Research on the Internet of Things: Social Sciences 2 (Jan. 5, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1033226; John Gudgel, Objects of Concern?: Risks, Rewards and Regulation in the “Internet of Things,” 3–8 (Apr. 30,
2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2430780; Adam D.
Thierer & Andrea Castillo, Projecting the Growth and Economic Impact of the
Internet of Things, MERCATUS CTR. (June 15, 2015), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/IoT-EP-v3.pdf.
236
VERIZON, supra note 5, at 3.
237
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238
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Each of these devices or things has a unique identification number (UID) and an Internet Protocol (IP)
address. These objects connect via cords, wires and
wireless technology, including satellites, cellular networks, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth. They use built-in electronic circuitry as well as radio frequency identification (RFID) or near-field communication (NFC) capabilities that are added later via chips and tags. Regardless of the exact approach, the IoT involves the
movement of data to enable processes from across
the room or somewhere on the other side of the
world.240
It is the IoT that enables “epidemiologists to track the spread of
viruses in near real time. A grocery store can analyze how people
shop and the products they view and buy as an individual walks
through the store . . . . A pharmaceutical firm can understand consumption patterns in real time.”241 Because of the IoT, “a city can
crunch data from sensors and other systems to better manage congestion, waste management, utilities, natural resources, and much
more . . . . The technology brings intelligence and a far greater level
of insight and understanding to a vast array of physical and virtual
systems.”242
B.
Unintended Consequences
The future of the IoT is not all positive. Unintended consequences include the likelihood of “new types of crime, weapons and
warfare. It could also create significant political and social problems
by, among other things, contributing to a growing disconnect between people. It will certainly cause society to more closely examine
the notion of privacy and security.”243 Indeed, the information-silo
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or information-bubble phenomenon presents a societal and management governance threat.244
Akamai observed, “The rapid proliferation of IoT devices, primarily in the home environment, adds a . . . layer of problems for
network defenders. The creation of new features to distinguish one’s
products in the market is always a driving factor for manufacturers.”245 This is a costly societal problem because “[t]here are far too
many organizations that consider security to be at the bottom of their
list of priorities, if they consider it at all.”246 For example, Korean
appliance manufacturer LG recently attended the Las Vegas Consumer Electronics Show, “where not only was an Internet refrigerator announced, but LG stated that every device it sells in the near
future will have Internet-connected capabilities. Regardless of LG’s
success at securing these devices, they are establishing a new standard feature set, which low-end competitors will move to emulate.”247
Akamai raises the question, “Does every home need a refrigerator
that not only takes pictures of its own contents, but also has a builtin web browser on the front? The market seems to think they do, but
the security implications are troublesome.”248
Instances of hackers infiltrating automobiles, baby monitors,
and video cameras are reported in the popular media.249 With a goal
of exposing vulnerabilities to manufacturers so that they may improve their products, so-called white-hat hackers have found and reported code weaknesses in IoT-connected medical devices, “including insulin pumps, ventilators, and defibrillators.”250
FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez stated, “We have seen an explosion of surveillance technologies, such as drones and mobile device tracking sensors in retail stores. We have moved from an ecosystem where companies track consumers across websites to one
244

See Lawrence J. Trautman, Governing Risk and the Information Silo Problem: Engineering a Systemic Cultural and Communications Solution for Cyber 6–
7 (Mar. 19, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2925352.
245
AKAMAI TECHS., STATE OF THE INTERNET / SECURITY Q4 2016 REPORT 6
(Martin McKeay ed., 2016), https://www.akamai.com/us/en/multimedia/documents/state-of-the-internet/q4-2016-state-of-the-internet-security-report.pdf.
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where companies track us across apps and even across devices.”251
She further warned, “And now, many consumer devices and appliances—from your [F]itbit to your fridge to your thermostat—are silently talking to one another, collecting data, and transmitting that
information to various third parties.”252 Some may be surprised to
learn that “even the once private act of reading is generating data
about us, as e-book companies track not just what we read, but also
how we read—where we start, what passages we skim, reread, or
highlight, and whether we actually finish the books we begin.”253
1.
UNDERLYING TECHNOLOGY
The genesis of the term “Internet of Things” is credited to technology pioneer Kevin Ashton, who reportedly incorporated the term
in a presentation he made to Proctor & Gamble (P&G) in 1999.254
Ashton’s idea was to link the Internet with Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology and to interest retail giants such as
P&G.255 Today’s RFID tags, “can be produced for under a penny
and are capable of performing real-time, constant data exchange and
can be read by scanners.”256 It wasn’t until the early 2000s that technological advances provided a platform for achieving the true potential of Internet-connected devices.257
2.
GROWTH AND IMPORTANCE OF MOBILE
A single incident responsible for catapulting the IoT into exponential growth is difficult to isolate. However, introduction of the
Apple iPhone in 2007:

Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n., Keynote Address at
the Technology Policy Institute Aspen Forum (Aug. 22, 2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/980623/ramirez_-_protecting_consumer_privacy_in_digital_age_aspen_8-22-16.pdf.
252
Id.
253
Id.
254
See Shackelford et al., supra note 235, at 421 (citing Kevin Ashton, That
‘Internet of Things’ Thing, RFID J. (June 22, 2009), www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?4986).
255
Id.
256
Britton, supra note 235, at 3.
257
See GREENGARD, supra note 74, at xii.
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was a crystallizing event. It put smartphones into the
hands of the masses. It put real-time . . . communication on the map . . . . Consider: In January 2008, Apple had sold approximately 3.7 million units. By June
2014, the number had topped 500 million. Today, the
total number of smartphones in use worldwide is
somewhere in the vicinity of 1.9 billion. By 2019,
Sweden telecom firm Ericsson estimates the number
will exceed 5.6 billion.258
The explosive growth since 2010 of dynamic IoT devices is
“based on insights gleaned from the processing of real-time information and historical data with minimum human interaction,” and
results from three main catalysts.259 When combined, three factors
provided a perfect environment of smart and interconnected devices
that nurtured the creation of the IoT:
First, the widespread availability of broadband Internet provided high speed network connectivity that
enabled devices to communicate with each other
over a wireless network across large parts of the developed world. Second, enhanced computational capabilities enabled the real-time analysis of large
amounts of unstructured data.
Third, the decreasing cost of sensors allowed manufacturers to add small wireless chips to any device
for a minor incremental cost.260
Application of RFID technology is much more than just a tool
for maximizing profits and reducing costs. Samuel Greengard observed that RFID:
builds a bridge between the physical world and the
virtual world. By attaching a small tag to an object
(or installing a chip into a device)—either a tiny passive transponder using electromagnetic radiation or a
258
259
260

Id. at xii–xiii.
See Shackelford et al., supra note 235, at 421–22.
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battery powered passive or active tag that relies on
UHF radio waves—and setting up an RFID reader,
anything and everything can be connected to the Internet. Today RFID technology is used for toll collections, contactless payment systems, tracking animals, managing baggage at airports, embedding data
in passports, following runners in [sic] marathons,
and tracking golfballs via a smartphone app.261
3.
INDUSTRIAL INTERNET
Samuel Greengard describes the Industrial Internet as revolving
“around machines equipped with sensors, thus making them ‘smart.’
These devices often serve as the plumbing or IT foundation for the
IoT.”262 It is the connectivity to sensor technology devices and miniaturization that is at the very heart of the Industrial Internet. These
newly available data points and systems connectivity make possible,
“things as diverse as geolocation and GPS devices, bar code scanners, thermometers, barometers, humidity gauges, vibration sensors,
pressure sensors, gyroscopes, magnetometers, cameras, audio and
video monitors, accelerometers, motion sensors, radar, sonar, and
lidar” (used by Google to operate its driverless car).263 Key capabilities made possible by the Industrial Internet include: location
awareness;264 enhanced situational awareness;265 sensor-based decision analytics;266 automation and controls;267 and a connected military.268
A series of competing protocols and communications technologies are involved in the contemporary IoT ecosystem. These technologies include: actuator networks; machine-to-machine (M2M)
communications; near-field communications (NFC); RFID; and

261
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See id. at 60–64.
See id. at 64–67.
See id. at 67–69.
See id. at 69–72.
See id. at 72–74.

2018]

INDUSTRIAL CYBER VULNERABILITIES

809

wireless sensor devices and networks.269 Katherine Britton observes:
NFC evolved from RFID and is a short-range, lowpower wireless way to transfer small amounts of data
between devices; NFC technology is built into 20
percent of mobile phones and most commonly is
used for mobile payment services such as Google
Wallet. M2M transmissions refer to direct communications between machines such as a microchip and a
microchip scanner, a wearable and a third-party application (app), or a wearable and a monitoring hub.
When machines communicate directly with other
machines, a device collects information through a
sensor that can then use a radio transmitter to send
the data over a wired or wireless network. M2M
transmissions share information without any special
configuration or other setup requirements. Cellular
and mobile data transmission standards such as LTE,
4G, GSM, and CDMA will connect devices to the
mobile phone network. Larger “things” will be able
to communicate via fixed wire lines such as Ethernet
and optical fiber. Most connections likely will take
place via wireless networks with chips embedded
into “things” using standards such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, ZigBee, Z-Wave, NFC, and RFID in order to
communicate. The number of installed M2M connections continues to grow due to the declining cost
of sensors and increased connectivity capabilities
and data processing power.270
4.
IOT AND HEALTH
The potential benefits and implications of IoT in medicine delivery and health care are enormous. Greengard observes that RFID
sensors or other “devices implanted in the human body or worn on
the body could gather data and use the IoT to transmit specific in-

269
270

Britton, supra note 235, at 3.
Id. at 3–4.

810

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:761

formation about blood pressure, blood sugar, heartbeat and other vitals while also monitoring medication dosage.”271 Immediately upon
detecting a problem while monitoring elderly patients, nanobots
could notify a physician.272 Greengard provides the example of Portland’s Oregon Health Sciences University (OHSU) as a healthcare
real-time location system (RTLS).273 Accordingly:
health and research institution tags assets ranging
from infusion pumps to crutches so that they are easy
to locate. In addition they are able to track performance data related to the device. This approach not
only saves time that would otherwise be spent hunting down equipment, it helps ensure that devices are
in working order. OHSU is now looking into tagging
patients and clinicians to better understand where
they spend time, how they move around within the
facility, and how long patients wait in a room before
a clinician arrives.274
5.
VALUE PROPOSITION
The profound healthcare benefits cited above raise the very real
subjective issue on how to appropriately place a monetary value on
life. Any such inquiry is far beyond the scope of this article. However, it is apparent that sensor technologies and the Industrial Internet present a potentially exponential technological benefit, perhaps
spawning “economic activity measuring in the tens of trillions of
dollars.”275 As Greengard observed, “[e]ven a 1 percent reduction in
fuel costs or a similar improvement in capital expenditures of system
inefficiency could produce savings in the tens of billions or hundreds of billions of dollars.”276
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6.
IOT EXPLOITABLE SECURITY FLAWS
In his prepared remarks before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence in 2017, Director of National Intelligence Daniel R.
Coats observed:
The widespread incorporation of “smart” devices
into everyday objects is changing how people and
machines interact with each other and the world
around them, often improving efficiency, convenience, and quality of life. Their deployment has also
introduced vulnerabilities into both the infrastructure
that they support and on which they rely, as well as
the processes they guide. Cyber actors have already
used IoT devices for distributed denial-of-service
(DDoS) attacks, and we assess they will continue. In
the future, state and non-state actors will likely use
IoT devices to support intelligence operations or domestic security or to access or attack targeted computer networks.277
By mid-2016, numerous security flaws in IoT devices were being
exploited, as demonstrated by the Mirai botnet attacks.
7.
MIRAI BOTNET ATTACKS
Akamai began tracking a strain of malware during June 2016
that targets IoT devices and home Internet routers.278 Soon thereafter, this malware, under the name Mirai, spread worldwide.279 Akamai observed that “Mirai [is] truly exceptional i[n] its use of IoT
devices and several capabilities that aren’t often seen in botnets: specifically, Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) based attacks, varying levels of attack traffic customization, and telnet scanning. In

277
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See AKAMAI TECHS., STATE OF THE INTERNET / SECURITY Q3 2016 REPORT
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addition, it generates its attacks directly . . . .”280 Akamai predicted,
“Due to the public release of the source code . . . we’re likely to see
new, more-capable variants of Mirai in the near future.”281
Moreover, Akamai found:
Mirai is a botnet that would not exist if more networks practiced basic hygiene, such as blocking insecure protocols by default. This is not new—we’ve
seen similar network hygiene issues as the source of
infection in the Brobot attacks of 2011 and 2012. The
botnet spreads like a worm, using telnet and more
than 60 default username and password combinations to scan the Internet for additional systems to infect. The majority of these systems appear to be Digital Video Recorders (DVRs), IP-enabled surveillance cameras, and consumer routers. Once a system
is infected, it connects to the command and control
(C2) structure of the botnet, then continues scanning
for other vulnerable systems while waiting for attack
commands.282
8.
KREBS ON SECURITY ATTACKS
In its Q3 2016 Internet security report, Akamai noted that the
two highest volume attacks seen as of that date on the Prolexic network consisted of attacks on sites used by security blogger Brian
Krebbs.283
Krebs is a security blogger who has been the target of extensive
large-scale DDoS attacks in response to his reporting.284 According
to Akamai, Krebs was the target of 269 attacks between 2012 and
2016.285 Exhibit 4 details the size and timing of the DDoS attacks
on Krebs on Security during this period, and Akamai noted that a
series of attacks in September 2016 were the largest DDoS attacks
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Akamai has defended against.286 Akamai explained that an “observant reader can probably correlate clumps of attacks to specific
stories covered by Krebs,” and also opined that “[r]eporting on the
dark side of cybersecurity draws attention from people and organizations who are not afraid of using DDoS attacks to silence their
detractors.”287
Exhibit 4
All Attacks Mitigated for krebsonsecurity.com while on the
Routed Platform288

Source: Akamai
Before 2016, “the largest DDoS attacks were in the range of 100
Gbps, growing to 300 Gbps in first half of 2016, and finally into the
500–600 Gbps range in the third quarter.”289 Exhibit 5 depicts how
the Mirai botnet produces a specific Domain Name System (DNS)
query flood. Akamai explained that “this dns query flood can potentially cause more damage than current dns reflection attacks. If a
targeted dns server is unprepared for a sustained flood of queries
with high packet rates, dns Water Torture can lead to a denial of
service for legitimate users.”290

286
287
288
289
290

Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 14.
AKAMAI TECHS., supra note 45, at 17.
Id. at 8.

814

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:761

Exhibit 5
Mirai DNS Attack Queries Are Sent from Bots to their Local DNS
Servers and go on to the Target Authoritative DNS Servers291

Source: Akamai
By the first quarter 2017, Akamai detected additional disruptive
Mirai attacks and observed that “[t]he botnets’ capabilities quickly
moved into a stage where contention for Internet of Things (IoT)
devices reduced the size of attacks considerably. While many of the
largest DDoS attacks observed this quarter were still based on Miraiderived botnets, they were not as large as the initial attacks.”292 The
Marai case study reveals that to be effective, attacks need not be
particularly big. Akamai stated, “If we consider that many businesses lease uplinks to the Internet in the range of 1–10 Gbps, any
attack exceeding 10 Gbps could be ‘big enough’ and more than capable of taking the average unprotected business offline.”293 In addition, Akamai warned:
the effects of IoT are not to be underestimated, and
the IoT ecosystem has drawn the attention of a wider
audience. A recent example is malware that compromises Internet-enabled toasters to mine Bitcoins, an
effort that appears to have been an ineffective proof
of concept. Another trend is represented by the
291
292
293
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BrickerBot botnet, which attacks systems exposed
directly to the Internet with default Telnet passwords
apparently in an attempt to prevent their use by the
Mirai botnet. If this botnet is unable to disconnect the
target device from the Internet, it corrupts the configuration, permanently bricking the devices. Neither of
these examples are major threats, but they do show a
significant increase in attention from both the hacker
and security communities.
There is one factor that seems to be affecting the
DDoS landscape as a whole: law enforcement. Early
attacks by the Mirai botnets appear to have been triggered by the announcement of the arrests of two
teens in Israel who were responsible for the vDos
botnet—a DDoS-for-hire tool that netted them hundreds of thousands of dollars. More recently, Europol
coordinated the arrest of 34 individuals across 13
countries as part of an effort called Operation Tarpit.
Operations like Tarpit target the largest services responsible for DDoS attacks directed at banks, gaming companies, and retailers. This can have a significant effect in reducing the number of attacks on
these organizations.294
Efforts to combat these threats are complicated by the fact that
most of these botnets are discrete code compositions, making for an
expanding universe of numerous “Mirai-derived botnets using similar software, each a small fragment and distinct entity . . . . One
concern is that a unified command and control (C2) structure could
emerge . . . . [and] such a super botnet could generate a DDoS attack
of two Tbps in the near future.”295 Ultimately, “[i]f these networks
gain unfettered Internet access, the devices could be capable of emitting 20 times more attack traffic than we’ve seen to date.”296
Europol is credited with coordinating global efforts among the
international security community to combat Mirai IoT-based botnets
294
295
296
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including Mirai.297 Akamai cautioned how myopic it is to consider
Mirai as the only threat.298 “With the release of the source code, any
aspect of Mirai could be incorporated into other botnets. Even without adding Mirai’s capabilities, there is evidence that botnet families
like BillGates, elknot, and XOR are mutating to take advantage of
the changing landscape.”299 As to the future, Akamai urges the importance of recognizing that DDoS and IoT’s other threats “are just
one aspect of the threat landscape . . . . Organizations may monitor
the login page logs of their sites, but are they watching the traffic for
their [application programming interfaces (APIs)]? Site-to-site and
business-to-business APIs may be a bigger target than most realize.”300
9.
FTC AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
The FTC has begun to address IoT matters that impact consumers in the United States.301 On August 22, 2016, FTC Chairwoman
Ramirez discussed the important role of the FTC “in empowering
consumers and ensuring they have control over their personal information.”302 Chairwoman Ramirez argued that control may be
achieved by:
(1) conducting research to ensure that our policymaking efforts appropriately address privacy and security risks as the marketplace evolves; (2) using our
law enforcement authority to ensure that consumers’
choices are honored and that companies safeguard
the consumer data they collect; and (3) helping spur
innovation in the creation of tools that help consumers express choices.303
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One example of such law enforcement authority is the FTC’s
2017 agreement with VIZIO to settle charges the consumer electronics company collected viewing histories on 11 million smart televisions without consent from users.304 Other FTC actions implicating
consumer protection have addressed issues such as artificial intelligence;305 blockchain technology;306 and computer routers and cameras.307 For example, the FTC brought an action during 2016 against
ASUS, a manufacturer of wireless routers.308 In discussing the critical importance of subjecting IoT devices to pre-launch security testing, Chairwoman Ramirez observed that in the ASUS matter, “we
alleged that the company’s failure to test its Internet-connected routers prior to launch contributed to several security breaches. We

See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, VIZIO to Pay $2.2 Million to FTC,
State of New Jersey to Settle Charges It Collected Viewing Histories on 11 Million Smart Televisions without Users’ Consent (Feb. 6, 2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/02/vizio-pay-22-millionftc-state-new-jersey-settle-charges-it.
305
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC to Host FinTech Forum on
March 9 on Artificial Intelligence and Blockchain Technology (Mar. 8, 2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/03/ftc-host-fintech-forummarch-9-artificial-intelligence-blockchain.
306
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC to Host FinTech Forum on
Artificial Intelligence and Blockchain March 9 (Jan. 13, 2017),
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charged that ASUS’ actions were both deceptive and unfair, in violation of Section 5.”309 Other subject areas of focus for the FTC include connected cars;310 consumer demographics;311 consumer
scams;312 crowdfunding;313 data breach;314 and data security.315 An
example of data security enforcement may be found in the FTC’s
2016 action taken against large advertising network InMobi.316 The
309
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See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Extends Deadline for Comments on Privacy, Security Issues to Be Examined as Part of Connected Cars
Workshop (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/
2017/04/ftc-extends-deadline-comments-privacy-security-issues-be-examined.
311
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Workshop Will Examine
Changing Consumer Demographics (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2016/11/ftc-workshop-will-examine-changing-consumerdemographics.
312
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Puts an End to Data Broker
Operation that Helped Scam More than $7 Million from Consumers’ Accounts
(Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/11/ftcputs-end-data-broker-operation-helped-scam-more-7-million; Press Release, Fed.
Trade Comm’n, FTC Presents Criminal Liaison Unit Award to Fraud and Cybercrime Unit of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York
(Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/10/ftc-presents-criminal-liaison-unit-award-fraud-cybercrime-unit-us.
313
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Announces Agenda, Panelists for Oct. 26 FinTech Forum on Peer-to-peer Payments and Crowdfunding (Oct.
17,
2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/10/ftc-announces-agenda-panelists-oct-26-fintech-forum-peer-peer.
314
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Operators of AshleyMadison.com
Settle FTC, State Charges Resulting from 2015 Data Breach that Exposed 36 Million Users’ Profile Information (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2016/12/operators-ashleymadisoncom-settle-ftc-statecharges-resulting; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, What to Do When You
Suspect a Data Breach: FTC Issues Video and Guide for Businesses (Oct. 25,
2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/10/what-do-whenyou-suspect-data-breach-ftc-issues-video-guide.
315
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC to Host Data Security Conference in Chicago June 15 (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
press-releases/2016/04/ftc-host-data-security-conference-chicago-june-15.
316
See Ramirez, supra note 251, at 11 (citing Press Release, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Mobile Advertising Network InMobi Settles FTC Charges It Tracked
Hundreds of Millions of Consumers’ Locations Without Permission (June 22,
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FTC charged InMobi with violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act,
based upon InMobi’s deceptive activities.317 Chairwoman Ramirez
explained,
InMobi offered app developers software code to embed in their
apps to enable them to serve targeted advertising, including advertising based on geolocation. It represented that its software would
track consumers’ locations only when consumers had granted access
to that information. The FTC alleged that, in actuality, InMobi had
used consumers’ geolocation information, which it was able to infer,
to target ads, even when consumers had not granted geolocation permission.318
As IoT devices proliferate and as digital threats become increasingly sophisticated, the FTC’s policing of companies’ digital privacy practices is becoming increasingly pervasive. The FTC’s areas
of focus have become extremely broad and include a vast array of

2016), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2016/06/mobile-advertising-network-inmobi-settles-ftc-charges-it-tracked).
317
Id.
318
Id.
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topics like data security and small businesses;319 digital advertising;320 drones;321 e-commerce;322 how electricity generation facilities connect to the transmission grid;323 FinTech (artificial intelligence and blockchain);324 health apps;325 home devices;326 identity

See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Testifies Before House Committee About Data Security and Small Businesses (Mar. 8, 2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/03/ftc-testifies-housecommittee-about-data-security-small.
320
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Digital Advertising Company Settles FTC Charges It Deceptively Tracked Consumers Both Online and Through
Their Mobile Devices (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2016/12/digital-advertising-company-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceptively.
321
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC to Host Fall Seminar Series
on Emerging Consumer Technology Issues (Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/press-releases/2016/03/ftc-host-fall-seminar-series-emerging-consumer-technology-issues.
322
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Welcomes Revised OECD
Guidelines for E-commerce (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
press-releases/2016/04/ftc-welcomes-revised-oecd-guidelines-e-commerce.
323
See Federal Trade Commission, Comment on Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission’s Proposed Rule Concerning “Reform of Generator Interconnection
Procedures and Agreements” (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/advocacy_documents/comment-staff-federal-trade-commission-federal-energy-regulatory-commission-concerning-reform/v170004_ferc_interconnection_ftc_staff_comment.pdf.
324
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Announces Agenda for
March 9 FinTech Forum on Artificial Intelligence and Blockchain Technology
(Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/02/ftc-announces-agenda-march-9-fintech-forum-artificial.
325
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Releases New Guidance for
Developers of Mobile Health Apps (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2016/04/ftc-releases-new-guidance-developers-mobilehealth-apps.
326
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 301.
319

2018]

INDUSTRIAL CYBER VULNERABILITIES

821

theft;327 mobile devices;328 online tracking of consumers;329 peer-topeer payment systems;330 personal information scams;331 privacy
and consumer protection;332 ransomware;333 sharing economy platforms;334 smart TV;335 software developer risks;336 software security

See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Identity Theft: Planning for the
Future (May 24, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2017/
05/planning-future-conference-about-identity-theft (observing that during 2014,
17.6 million individuals—7% of all U.S. residents age 16 and older—were victims of one or more incidents of identity theft).
328
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC to Study Mobile Device Industry’s Security Update Practices (May 9, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2016/05/ftc-study-mobile-device-industrys-security-update-practices.
329
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Approves Final Consent Order with Online Company Charges with Deceptively Tracking Consumers Online
and Through Mobile Devices (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
press-releases/2017/04/ftc-approves-final-consent-order-online-companycharged.
330
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 310.
331
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Data Broker Defendants Settle
FTC Charges They Sold Sensitive Personal Information to Scammers (Feb. 18,
2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/02/data-broker-defendants-settle-ftc-charges-they-sold-sensitive.
332
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, How to Participate in FTC’s Second PrivacyCon (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/
2017/01/how-participate-ftcs-second-privacycon.
333
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Offers Advice on How to
Avoid and Respond to Ransomware Attacks (Nov. 10, 2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/11/ftc-offers-advice-howavoid-respond-ransomware-attacks.
334
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE “SHARING” ECONOMY: ISSUES FACING
PLATFORMS, PARTICIPANTS & REGULATORS 1–9 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/sharing-economy-issues-facing-platforms-participants-regulators-federal-trade-commission-staff/p151200_ftc_staff_report_on_the_sharing_economy.pdf.
335
See Lesley Fair, Ransomware, Smart TV, Drones—Oh, My!, FED. TRADE
COMMISSION: BUS. BLOG (Mar. 31, 2016, 11:04 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/business-blog/2016/03/ransomware-smart-tv-drones-oh-my.
336
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Issues Warning Letters to
App Developers Using ‘Silverpush’ Code (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/press-releases/2016/03/ftc-issues-warning-letters-app-developersusing-silverpush-code.
327
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issues;337 technology used to track consumers across multiple Internet-connected devices;338 and telecommunications regulation.339
VI.

EXPOSURE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT CYBER TOOLS

Not even the highest echelons of government military-grade
cyber secrets are safe. Over the past two years, multiple parties have
come into possession of cyber weapons developed and used by the
U.S. government. Beginning in August 2016, a hacker collective
known only as “the Shadow Brokers” began releasing and auctioning off a set of cyber weapons belonging to the NSA’s highly secretive Office of Tailored Access Operations (TAO).340 Tools released
by the Shadow Brokers in April 2017 have been implicated in the
massive ransomware threat known as WannaCry.341 In March 2017,
Wikileaks released a huge trove of partially redacted hacking tools
that the organization attributed to the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA).342
337
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Approves Final Order in Oracle Java Security Case (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2016/03/ftc-approves-final-order-oracle-java-security-case.
338
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n., FTC Releases New Report on
Cross-Device Tracking (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2017/01/ftc-releases-new-report-cross-device-tracking.
339
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Provides Response to
NTIA Request for Comment on Internet of Things (June 3, 2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/06/ftc-staff-provides-response-ntia-request-comment-internet-things.
340
See Joseph Menn, Russian Researchers Expose Breakthrough U.S. Spying
Program, REUTERS (Feb. 16, 2015, 2:43 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-cyberspying-idUSKBN0LK1QV20150216; David E. Sanger, ‘Shadow Brokers’ Leak Raises Alarming Question: Was the N.S.A. Hacked?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/17/us/shadow-brokers-leak-raisesalarming-question-was-the-nsa-hacked.html.
341
See Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger, Hackers Hit Dozens of Countries
Exploiting Stolen N.S.A. Tool, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/world/europe/uk-national-health-service-cyberattack.html.
342
Greg Miller & Ellen Nakashima, WikiLeaks Says It Has Obtained Trove of
CIA Hacking Tools, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/wikileaks-says-it-has-obtained-trove-ofcia-hacking-tools/2017/03/07/c8c50c5c-0345-11e7-b1e9a05d3c21f7cf_story.html.
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A.
NSA and the Shadow Brokers
In August 2016, the Shadow Brokers announced a putative auction of a series of cyber tools that the group claimed had been stolen
from the “Equations Group,” a highly advanced hacking group that
has been connected with TAO.343 The Shadow Brokers released a
number of leaks during 2016, including tools aimed at exploiting
firewalls and network infrastructure engineered by companies that
include Cisco, Juniper, Fortinet, and Huawei, a Chinese company.344
At the same time, the group also released another cache of encrypted files, claiming they would provide the password to this
cache to the winner of a Bitcoin auction.345 The fundraising auction
effort was ultimately a failure.346 On April 8, 2017, the Shadow Brokers publicly released the password to this encrypted cache of
files.347
On April 14, 2017, the group released by far the most damaging
leaks to date, including a Microsoft Windows zero-day exploit
known as ETERNALBLUE.348 This exploit—despite the fact Mi-

343

See Sanger, supra note 337; see also Dan Goodin, Confirmed: Hacking
Tool Leak Came from ‘Omnipotent’ NSA-Tied Group, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 16,
2016, 5:09 PM), https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/08/code-dumped-onlinecame-from-omnipotent-nsa-tied-hacking-group/.
344
See Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, NSA Targeted Chinese Firewall
Maker Huawei, Leaked Documents Suggest, MOTHERBOARD (Aug. 24, 2016, 9:00
AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/nsa-huawei-firewalls-shadowbrokers-leak.
345
See Joseph Cox, They’re Back: The Shadow Brokers Release More Alleged
Exploits, MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 8, 2017, 11:33 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/theyre-back-the-shadow-brokers-release-more-alleged-exploits.
346
See Janus Kopfstein, “Shadow Brokers” Whine3 that Nobody Is Buying
Their Hacked NSA Files, MOTHERBOARD (Oct. 1, 2016, 4:00 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/shadow-brokers-whine-that-nobody-is-buyingtheir-hacked-nsa-files.
347
See Cox, supra note 345.
348
See Dan Goodin, NSA-Leaking Shadow Brokers Just Dumped Its Most
Damaging Release Yet, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 14, 2017, 1:27 PM), https://arstechnica.com/security/2017/04/nsa-leaking-shadow-brokers-just-dumped-its-mostdamaging-release-yet/.
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crosoft issued a patch for it in March 2017, leading some commentators to speculate the company had been tipped off about it349—was
subsequently used in the massive ransomware attack, known as
WannaCry, that has infected over a quarter-million machines to
date.350 The WannaCry virus has since been linked to a hacker group
affiliated with North Korea, which has been responsible for multiple
sophisticated attacks, including the 2014 attack against Sony Pictures.351
B.
CIA and Wikileaks
Yet another installment in the saga of intelligence community
data hacks is the WikiLeaks exposure of CIA cyber tools during
March 2017.352 The New York Times reported that the documents
were “detailed, highly technical catalogue of tools” and “include[d]
instructions for compromising a wide range of common computer
tools for use in spying: the online calling service Skype; Wi-Fi networks; documents in PDF format; and even commercial antivirus
programs . . . used by millions of people . . . .”353 WikiLeaks’ initial
release “of secret C.I.A. material, included 7,818 web pages with
943 attachments, many of them partly redacted by Wikileaks editors
to avoid disclosing the actual code for cyberweapons. The entire archive of C.I.A. material consists of several hundred million lines of
computer code, the group claimed.”354
VII.

TOPICS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The following topics for future research seem to be particularly
promising: how will the huge amount of data generated from IoT
devices be preserved? What legal framework is needed to protect
privacy interests?
349
Richard Lawler, Microsoft Says It Already Patched ‘Shadow Brokers’ NSA
Leaks, ENGADGET (Apr. 15, 2017), https://www.engadget.com/2017/04/15/microsoft-says-it-already-patched-several-shadow-brokers-nsa-l/.
350
See Perlroth & Sanger, supra note 341.
351
See id.
352
See Scott Shane, Matthew Rosenberg & Andrew W. Lehren, WikiLeaks
Releases Trove of Alleged C.I.A. Hacking Documents, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/world/europe/wikileaks-cia-hacking.html.
353
Id.
354
Id.
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As billions of IoT sensors and devices come to occupy our physical environment, Richard S. Whitt warns:
Many of these systems would be collecting, analyzing, and storing often critical data across entire sectors of the economy. It may be misguided to expect
that sensors placed in the field will continue providing useful data for their expected lives of years, even
decades. Many such devices are doomed to become
useless “abandonware” after supporting cloud services are altered or discontinued. Even those in continuing operation risk becoming insecure.355
Many of the issues raised in this article have wide-ranging implications, including on both criminal procedure and substantive
criminal law.356 How to apply criminal law to malware and digital
weapons has recently been in the news. A security researcher named
Marcus Hutchins, who helped prevent the spread of the WannaCry
ransomware virus in early 2017, was arrested by the FBI on August
2, 2017.357 The indictment charges Hutchins with “creating and distributing the Kronos banking trojan,” which is a piece of malware
that harvests online banking credentials and credit card data.358 The
indictment discusses that an as-yet arrested unnamed coconspirator
facilitated selling the malware that Hutchins allegedly created.359 As

Richard S. Whitt, “Through a Glass, Darkly” Technical, Policy, and Financial Actions to Avert the Coming Digital Dark Ages, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH
TECH. L.J. 117, 134 (2017) (footnotes omitted).
356
See, e.g., Ormerod & Trautman, supra note 19 (manuscript at 15).
357
See Joseph Cox, Researcher Who Stopped WannaCry Ransomware Detained in US After Def Con, MOTHERBOARD (Aug. 3, 2017, 12:22 PM),
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/ywp8k5/researcher-who-stoppedwannacry-ransomware-detained-in-us-after-def-con.
358
Joseph Cox, WannaCry Researcher Indicted for Allegedly Creating Banking Malware, MOTHERBOARD (Aug. 3, 2017, 3:07 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/pagn7v/malwaretech-wannacry-indictment-kronosmalware.
359
See id.
355
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Professor Orin Kerr has discussed, the case presents a difficult issue
of criminal law: whether it is a crime to create and sell malware.360
Of our hyper-connected future world, Samuel Greengard
warned, “[a]lready, serious concerns exist about whether this technology will dumb down society, lead to greater inequality, and expand the digital divide.”361 Greengard raised further questions:
Could automation cause massive unemployment and
downward mobility[?] Could it cause more crime or
new types of terrorism and warfare? How might it
change the legal system? What about the growing
problem with digital distraction? . . . How do we approach security and privacy in an era where almost
no movement or activity goes unnoticed or unrecorded?362
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The Stuxnet virus represents a paradigm-shifting event. Stuxnet
reveals to the world that a traditional military is no longer necessary
to wreak havoc on other countries’ military and civilian infrastructure installations. The implications for this shift are wide ranging
and innumerable.
Yet, the current climate within critical infrastructure industry
fails to grapple with the ramifications of Stuxnet. Both industry and
governments are unprepared to respond to a malware infection that
renders worthless the systems that developed countries rely on for
necessities as basic as food, water, telecommunications, and electricity.

360

See Orin Kerr, Opinion, The Kronos Indictment: Is It a Crime to Create
and Sell Malware?, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/08/03/the-kronos-indictment-ita-crime-to-create-and-sell-malware/?utm_term=.e3b71b7bfda2.
361
See Greengard, supra note 74, at xvii.
362
Id.

